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This thesis questions in what ways two major social movements, the Student Movement 
in 1999 and Green Movement in 2009, affected Iranian domestic politics. It argues that, 
although these movements seemed to fail, they succeeded in important ways. Essentially, 
these movements altered domestic politics by their emergence and resilient continuity as 
an alternative way of political participation for Iranians. The result of their continuation 
and expansion encouraged, and continues to encourage, more liberal tendencies. These 
movements occurred since the 1979 Iranian revolution, itself, planted their seeds in post-
revolutionary Iran by its outcomes, which created political opportunities, mobilizing 
structures, resources, and framing. Social movements became an alternative way of 
political participation, beginning from the Student Movement, and initiated the early 
changes in public opinion for a more liberal regime in 1999. Although the Iranian 
government brutally suppressed the Student Movement, its participants continued their 
struggle. The Green Movement in 2009 was a pro-democracy movement that united 
separate opposition groups in society, with broader frames and peaceful tactics, as a 
continuance of the Student Movement. It arguably shook the Islamic government’s 
legitimacy and changed Iranians’ opinion, which was reflected in the election of a 
reformist candidate in the 2013 presidential elections. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent Green Movement in Iran demonstrated, once again, the Iranians’ 
commitment to change their regime to more liberal ways by social movements, beginning 
with the nation's 1979 Islamic Revolution. This thesis questions in what ways two major 
social movements, the Student Movement in 1999 and Green Movement in 2009, 
affected Iranian domestic politics, in order to better understand and explain the role of 
social movements in Iranian domestic politics. The objective of this thesis is to show that 
although these movements seemed to fail, they succeeded in important ways. Essentially, 
these movements altered domestic conditions by their emergence and resilient continuity 
in Iranian domestic politics as an alternative way of political participation for ordinary 
Iranians. The result of their continuation and expansion is to encourage more liberal 
tendencies.  
Among the diverse political systems of the Middle East, contemporary Iran is a 
country that was founded after a revolutionary social movement which ended the tyranny 
of a monarch in favor of a more liberal political system that could provide better 
economic conditions, equality, justice, and respect for its citizens’ indigenous values. The 
last three decades, however, proved the opposite. After the revolution, the Shi’a ulema 
founded a theocracy with semi-democratic institutions, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), 
under its charismatic leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his concept of wilayat al-
faqih1 (guardianship of the jurist). The Iranian revolution toppled the last Shah, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and finished Iran's 2,500-year-old monarchy; Iranians, 
however, could not solve their long-lasting problems with a mere change of regime. 
Iran’s complex political system has been dependent on divine and popular legitimacy that 
has unelected and elected institutions, both of whose members have linkages with 
different factions of its society.2 The new regime consolidated its power in the early years 
of revolution and during the Iran-Iraq war. The new Iranian regime has depended on 
1 Ibrahim Moussawi, Shi’ism and the Democratization Process in Iran: With a Focus on Wilayat al-
Faqih (London: Saqi Books, 2011), 7. 
2 David E. Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Explanation of Iranian Leadership 
Dynamics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 22. 
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 Islamic law to establish justice and freedom by preventing the tyranny of the ancient 
government. The last three decades, however, showed that the Islamic Republic could not 
provide a more liberal regime, better economic conditions, equality, justice, and respect 
for Iranians’ values, and recent events arguably shook its legitimacy.  
Especially after the end of Iran-Iraq war and the death of Khomeini in 1989, 
Iranian society began to question the regime and seek solutions for the IRI’s continued 
economic, social, and political problems. Iranian society has changed during these years 
and become alienated from the revolutionary government’s ideology. Iranians organized 
in response to different events, utilizing Iranian mobilizational resources and indigenous 
Iranian cultural frames. The social movements in post-revolutionary Iran became an 
effective way of change and driving force of liberalization with their resilient resistance 
to Iranian state repression.  
A. IMPORTANCE OF IRANIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Analyses of the Iranian Student Movement and the Green Movement contribute 
both to the theory of social movements and to our understanding of the internal dynamics 
that shape the IRI’s domestic politics. This thesis analyzes Iranian social movements and 
their effects in a theocracy with semi-democratic institutions and a different culture. It 
sheds more light on Iranian internal dynamics, in order to help scholars of politics and 
policy makers to better assess Iranian domestic politics for future work.  
The Iranian political system provides political opportunities for opposition groups 
ranging from opportunities to threats in a distinct culture. The presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Iran create space for various factions of the society to discuss, 
somewhat freely, its problems and look for solutions. The IRI’s founding ideology 
promotes the participation of the people in governance as long as this process does not 
threaten the guardianship of the jurist and Islamic law, but the regime at the same time 
severely represses any opposition that suggests even moderate change for the system. 
Under these contradictory conditions, the Student Movement and Green Movement are 
good examples of “contentious politics”3 in a different culture, where Shi’a Islam 
3 Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 (Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 3. 
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 influences almost every aspect of daily life and frames economic, social, and political 
debates.  
The analyses of the Student and Green movements explain how social movements 
affect Iranian society and domestic politics in the IRI, in order to increase knowledge 
about internal politics in the closed Iranian system. Social movements in Iran are an 
increasingly important component of Iran’s internal dynamics, and serve as another way 
for Iranians to get involved in politics. Even if they cannot manage to achieve major 
institutional changes, they still manage to challenge the IRI’s authority and arbitrary rule 
by their struggle to change Iranian society, culture, and government policies. Their 
resilient existence in Iran, beginning after the Student Movement in 1999, made and still 
makes Iranians more active in politics, and pushes liberalization from below due to their 
insistence on a place in domestic politics. This testifies their importance. The IRI's 
violent suppression of the Green Movement, after the 2009 Iranian presidential elections, 
also exemplifies this important popular response to the IRI’s failure to fulfill its citizens’ 
economic, social, and political needs.  
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
To analyze why, when, and how the Student Movement in 1999 and the Green 
Movement in 2009 emerged and how they affected IRI’s domestic politics after the 
revolution, it is proper to use the social movement theory although it mainly explains 
social movements in democracies. In its cultural frames, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
political system partially provides similar political opportunities and mobilizing 
structures as those of liberal democracies, and this justifies the use of social movement 
theory to explain social movements in post-revolutionary Iran. 
Social movement theory argues that social movements take part in the internal 
dynamics of domestic politics as a continuum of traditional methods. Scholars of social 
movement theory define a social movement as a collective, organized, conscious, 
sustained, and non-institutional challenge to authorities or cultural beliefs and practices.4   
4 Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, “Editors’ Introduction,” in The Social Movements Reader: Cases 
and Concepts, ed. Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 4. 
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 The father of social movements, Charles Tilly, asserts that social movements emerged in 
Western Europe and North America during the eighteenth century as a new and 
distinctive form of “contentious politics.”5  From then on, they became an organized 
public effort making collective claims, employment of several political actions, and 
presentation of the worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC)6 of their 
participants. He suggests that social movements support democratization as much as they 
affect public politics and enable their participants to take part in political decision making 
by their outcomes or “by-products of their action.”7    
Social movements occur when political opportunities and threats or perceived 
political opportunities signal incentives for formal and informal organizations or groups 
to mobilize ordinary people with mediation of frames in their cultures. Political 
opportunities vary, from political opportunities to threats that give incentives, with the 
help of cultural frames, to mobilizing structures and resources in societies. Various 
scholars of social movements contribute to this theory when they criticize or discuss 
different aspects of political opportunities, mobilizing resources, and frames. For 
example, while Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly define six properties of regimes that 
facilitate or inhibit social movements,8 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. 
Zald reduce these factors to four and emphasize the importance of mobilizing structures 
and the framing process that enable social movement organizations to utilize these 
opportunities to demand change.9 
Paul D. Almeida proposes two avenues for opposition regarding opening political 
opportunities and threats in authoritarian settings like Iran. While the political system 
5 Charles Tilly, Social Movements 1768-2004, 3. 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 Ibid., 143.  
8 Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “Contentious Politics and Social Movements,” chap. 19 in The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 440. 
9 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures, and Framing Process-Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements,” in 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. 
Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10. 
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 provides political opportunities like institutional access, competitive elections, elite 
conflict, external allies, and relaxation of state repression for the opposition to launch 
collective action on the one hand, threats like state-attributed economic problems, 
erosions of rights, and increasing state repression also cause mobilization on the other.10  
Charles Kruzman argues that oppositional organizations’ internal dynamics and 
perceived political opportunities are more important for mobilization.11 As framing 
processes mediate between political opportunities and mobilizing resources, by creating 
cognitive liberation of the participants and groups in social movements, other scholars 
like Jane Mansbridge, Francesca Polletta, and James M. Jasper add the importance of 
oppositional consciousness12 and collective identity13 to this process.  
Social movements may have expected or unexpected outcomes that can change 
government institutions, different policies, political disclosures, their cultural 
environment, their participants’ identity, and public opinion. Social movements’ success 
and outcomes differ by the utilization of these opportunities, types and internal dynamics 
of opposition groups, and the efficacy of the frames, all of which enable social 
movements to change their external structures from formal institutions to public opinions 
or political disclosures. While a major part of social movement theory tries to explain 
when, why, and how social movements emerge, grow, and disappear or what their tactics 
are, another growing part of the study deals with finding what the consequences of social 
movements are and how efficient they are in affecting politics. In How Social Movements 
Matter, Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly present different perspectives 
of social movements’ political consequences by the social movements’ interaction with 
10 Paul D. Almeida, “Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in 
Authoritarian Settings,” chap. 7 in Readings on Social Movements: Origins, Dynamics, and Outcomes, ed. 
Doug McAdam, David A. Snow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 106. 
11 Charles Kruzman, “Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A Comparative 
Analysis of Four Religious Movements,” Mobilization 3, no. 1 (1998), 25. 
12 Jane Mansbridge, “The Making of Oppositional Consciousness,” in the Oppositional 
Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest, ed. Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1. 
13 Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," Annual 
Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 285. 
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 different interest groups, political parties, and their social environment.14  Another 
consensus suggests that, although social movements fall short in gaining their immediate 
goals, they do change public opinion, political disclosures, government institutions, and 
their societies’ cultures.15 
The 1979 Islamic Revolution’s institutions built the conditions under which social 
movements in Iran can occur. There are four steps to the argument underlying this thesis, 
derived from the social movement theory as it applies to the Iranian case.  
1. Political Opportunities and Threats 
The political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides both political 
opportunities and threats for the Student and Green Movements’ groups to mobilize and 
demand change, despite the government’s severe repression against any emerging threat. 
2. Mobilizing Structures and Resources 
Iranian civil society after the revolution has built ample organizations and 
resources to take part in social movements and to change the IRI’s domestic policy. 
3. Framing 
Shi’a Islam, evolving with the developing global values of liberty, provides 
frames that offer a high potential to link political opportunities and mobilizing resources 
in Iran.  
4. Outcomes 
Although the Iranian Student and Green Movements could not manage an entire 
regime or cause a major institutional change, they became a way of political participation 
and a driving force of liberalization that changed Iran’s society, culture, and public 
14 Marco Giugni, “How Social Movements Matter: Past Research, Present Problems, Future 
Developments,” int. in How Social Movements Matter, Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), XV.  
15 David S. Meyer, “How Social Movements Matter,” Contexts 2, no. 4 (2003), 31. 
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 opinion, affected its factions and their linked elite, and eventually pushed the government 
to change its domestic politics to more liberal ways. 
Consequently, this thesis argues that the Iranian Student and Green Movements 
make Iranian civil society more active in domestic politics by utilizing IRI’s 
opportunities, Iranian society’s mobilizing resources, and its cultural frames. Although 
IRI’s government has been trying to destroy any threat to its regime, these social 
movements push the IRI to implement more liberal policies, even as the movements fail 
to achieve any institutional changes by their resistance to state repression and influence 
on public opinion that leads the electorate to elect reformist presidents. 
To test these hypotheses and final argument, the outcomes of Iranian revolution 
and two major social movements in Iran need to be examined. As background, one 
should understand the 1979 Iranian revolution and its outcomes, because that event marks 
the beginning of the Iranian contemporary state structure and long-lasting social, 
economic, and political problems in Iran’s post-revolutionary structure. Later, the 
reformist period in Iran after the Iran-Iraq War and the Student Movement in 1999 help 
us to understand to what extent this period with the Student Movement changed Iranian 
domestic politics and society. Lastly, one should analyze the reemergence of hardliners in 
Iran with Ahmadinejad and the Green Movement in 2009 to understand how and why the 
IRI’s incumbent government first provided political opportunities and later suppressed 
significant Iranian opposition against the regime, and in what ways the Green Movement 
affected Iranian domestic politics. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although the literature that specifically addresses in what ways the 1999 Student 
Movement and 2009 Green Movement affected Iranian domestic politics and changed its 
internal dynamics is limited, a great number of scholarly works on political economy, 
sociology, and politics presents two opposing arguments, one pessimistic and the other 
optimistic, for this thesis. The pessimistic camp argues the Islamic regime after the 1979 
revolution is still stable and unwilling to change. The scholars of this camp claim that the 
IRI’s state structure is too rigid. The IRI political system’s unelected institutions, with 
 7 
 their security and economic offshoots, leave no chance for Iranian social movements to 
affect the IRI’s domestic politics. Opposed to this argument, the optimistic camp 
proposes that, from the beginning of the Student Movement, Iranian society has 
increasingly become aware of the regime’s problems, corruption of government officials, 
and illegitimacy of the regime’s ideology. Iranians demand change by becoming more 
active in these social movements. They push the IRI’s government to change its policies 
in a more liberal direction. 
1. Iranian Revolution  
As a starting point of new social movements in Iran, numerous scholars analyze 
different aspects of the 1979 Iranian revolution, and many conclude that the revolution 
had happened at an unexpected time, and it remains unfinished even today. The writings 
about the 1979 Iranian revolution provide a beginning for this thesis to unfold the main 
causes, dynamics, and consequences of two major social movements in Iran after the 
revolution. They demonstrate different revolutionary groups, their motives for 
mobilization against the Shah, the alliance of the urban middle class with the Shi’a 
ulema, the leadership of the Shi’a ulema, their links and organization that enable Iranians 
to support the movement, and the importance of Shi’a Islam with its practices that 
became one of the main frames of the revolution. They show how the social and political 
outcome of the revolution sowed the seeds of today’s economic, social, and political 
problems in Iran.  
For example, Mehran Kamrava emphasizes the inevitability of the revolution in 
his book, Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil. He analyzes the revolution in a 
framework in which internal and international developments reduced the last Shah’s 
power and authority, and drastic social change alienated oppositional groups from the 
state where these oppositional groups increased their activities and developed effective 
links among themselves and different social classes.16 This piece has a lot of information 
about revolutionary groups, social classes, their claims, and motivations.  
16 Mehran Kamrava, Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil (New York: Routledge, 1990), 12. 
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 Charles Kruzman, in his book, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, discusses 
several explanations for the Iranian revolution and argues that the 1979 Iranian revolution 
occurred with the perceived opportunities and expectation of a viable regime17 that 
mobilized a large number of Iranians from every strata of the society against the last 
Shah’s repression. He covers all possible explanations for revolution and shows the 
importance of perceived opportunities and the efficacy of links and Shi’a Islam’s 
framing. His article, “The Iranian Revolution,” examines the political opportunity 
structure in monarchies.18   
Poor People’s Movements in Iran, by Asef Bayat, examines the lives of Iran’s 
poor at the time of the revolution and their contribution to protest waves by their informal 
links and practices in the squatter and shanty towns of Tehran. He demonstrates the 
ordinary people’s collective power to gain their space and rights. Benjamin Smith’s 
article about Bazaar discusses the mobilization capacity and behavior of the marketplace; 
it presents the role of merchants at the time of the revolution and how their support alters 
the economic policies of the government after the revolution.19 Said A. Arjomand 
focuses on the significance of Shi’a Islam and political dynamics of radical change in 
Iran six years after the revolution in his article,20 and explains the effects of revolution 
from the beginning of Khomeini’s leadership to his successors in the book, After 
Khomeini: Iran Under his Successors.  
In Democracy in Iran,21 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr examine both the IRI’s state-
building and democracy-building after the revolution, with a historical view that reveals 
how the domestic power balance has changed and created new factions in Iranian 
17 Charles Kruzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 136. 
18 Charles Kurzman, “The Iranian Revolution,” in chap. 5 The Social Movements Reader: Cases and 
Concepts, ed. Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2003), 40. 
19 Benjamin Smith, “Collective Action with and without the Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran,” 
chap. 7 in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 2004), 199.  
20 Said Amir Arjomand, “Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” World Politics 38, 
no. 3 (1986), 383. 
21 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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 international dynamics. Moreover, The Shi’ism and Democratization Process by Ibrahim 
Moussawi explains how Islam and wilayat al-faqih shapes the Islamic Republic by its 
dual legitimacy, where divine and public authorities act based upon different 
perspectives, from jurisprudence to the state’s constitution.22 Finally, Reza Razavi asserts 
that the IRI’s current factionalist political system and lack of political parties, such as in 
liberal democracies, satisfy some of its internal problems but leave other interest groups 
out of political decision making, which dooms the IRI to either reform or collapse by its 
vibrant society.23   
2. Pessimistic Camp: No Liberal Change in Iran  
Many scholars in the pessimistic camp suggest that the IRI has rigid institutions, 
controlled by a conservative post-revolutionary elite that is unwilling to change Iranian 
domestic politics to liberal ways no matter what the Student and Green Movements have 
done and continue to do in Iran. This camp claims that even a moderate change in the IRI 
is unlikely because of the IRI’s state structure and the rigidity of its unelected institutions 
such as the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council. In addition to these institutions, their 
tailed security and economic branches, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
and bonyads (Islamic charity organizations), dominate all social, economic, and political 
platforms in Iran. They curtail development of an economically independent, strong 
middle class that may support oppositional groups by mobilizing resources. The subsidies 
and high public employment rates that still ensure the social contract in Iran help the 
incumbent government to control large parts of the society. The scholars of this camp 
take the Supreme Leader’s and the IRI president’s reactions to the recent Green 
Movement, as well as the severe state repression and rigid institutions of the IRI, as the 
main evidence of their arguments.  
In particular, Mullahs Guards and Bonyads: An Explanation of Iranian 
Leadership Dynamics,24 is one of the best resources about the IRI’s constitutional 
22 Ibrahim Moussawi, Shi’ism and the Democratization Process in Iran, 7. 
23 Reza Razavi, “The Road to Party Politics in Iran: 1979-2009,” Middle Eastern Studies, 46, no. 1 
(2010), 96. 
24 David E. Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, 5. 
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 structure and clearly defines both the IRI’s unelected and elected instutions. It draws the 
big picture of Iranian domestic power balance. This book shows what sort of Islamic 
Republic Khomeini built and how his succesors now run it according to their own 
interests. Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, in her comprehensive work, argues that the IRI 
has changed during its four decades in different areas. She suggests it is not impossible 
for a “religiously inspired nation-state like Iran”25 to undertake a political change toward 
more liberal ways. However, she concludes that the IRI’s current Supreme Leader Ali 
Hosseini Khamenei and his supporters are more than willing to unleash severe repression 
on any opposition, just as the Chinese Communist Party would do.      
Farhad Kazemi asserts that “Iranian politics is a system made by clerics for the 
clerics and for their supporters, who possess a near monopoly on the spoils of the 
revolution and the country’s resources.”26 In his two articles, “The Iranian Enigma”27 in 
1997 and “The Precarious Revolution: Unchanging Institutions and the Fate of Reform in 
Iran” in 2003, Kazemi identifies the IRI’s Guardian Council as an impassable obstacle in 
front of the judicial and executive arms of the political system, which uses its veto power 
on several occasions. The Guardian Council judges the qualifications of election 
candidates with its twelve members and prevents an emergence of a countering elite to 
the regime holders. Since the Guardian Council’s members are appointed by the Supreme 
Leader, their decisions comply with his individual will. William A. Sami28 and Cyrus 
Masroori29 also support this point of view in their articles. 
Finally, the scholars of political economy argue that the government and military 
control of the Iranian economy prevent development of an economically independent 
middle class and coerce the Iranian society to obey the government’s arbitrary rule 
25 Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, Evolving Iran: An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the 
Islamic Republic (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 217. 
26 Farhad  Kazemi, “The Precarious Revolution: Unchanging Institutions and the Fate of Reform in 
Iran,” Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 1 (2003), 82. 
27 Farhad Kazemi, “The Iranian Enigma,” Current History 96, no. 606 (1997), 40. 
28 A. William Samii, “Iran's Guardians Council as an Obstacle to Democracy,” The Middle East 
Journal 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), 643. 
29 Cyrus Masroori, “The Conceptual Obstacles to Political Reform in Iran,” Review of Politics 69, no. 
2 (2007), 171. 
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 through subsidies and high rates of public employment. Shayerah Ilias emphasizes the 
economic role of bonyads and economic control of the IRGC, which was founded as the 
true security force of the new regime in the early years of the revolution. He asserts that 
the IRGC controls all borders and trade routes as well as the telecommunications sector 
of the IRI.30 The IRGC gives the incumbent government a strong ability to control all 
activities of opposition groups. Professor Robert Looney, who once served as an 
economic adviser to the last Iranian Shah, assesses the Iranian economy in a historical 
perspective and demonstrates its capacity and mismanagement by the post-revolutionary 
governments. He asserts that the state control of all economic sectors and subsidies 
causes a lack of private business and economic liberation.31 This economic structure 
diminishes the mobilizing resources and political opportunities for oppositional groups in 
Iran. 
3. Optimistic Camp: A More Liberal Iran is Possible 
The optimistic camp, which surprisingly includes Mr. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the 
last Iranian Shah, indirectly argues that the Student and Green Movements are changing 
Iranian society and influencing the IRI’s domestic politics even if they cannot manage to 
make an institutional change in Iran. The scholars of this camp claim that the relative 
liberation of the IRI’s domestic politics, with economic reform efforts after the end of 
Iran-Iraq war and during the reformist era under the presidency of the moderate cleric 
Muhammad Khatami, provided opportunities and relative free space for the re-
establishment of opposition groups.32 Among these groups, students started the 
irreversible change in Iranian internal dynamics. The interpretation of political Islam, 
democracy, and human rights in Iran has changed. The growing number of educated 
young men and, especially, women seek their rights through social movements, and their 
number is growing. This new generation does not share the same ideas with the post-
30 Shayerah Ilias, Iran’s Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, 
April 22, 2010, 15. 
31 Robert Looney, “The Iranian Economy: The Glass Half Empty,” Prosperity in Depth: Iran, The 
2012 Legatum Prosperity Index: Iran, 141. 
32 Ray Takeyh, “Iran at a Crossroads,” The Middle East Journal 57, no. 1 (2003), 42. 
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 revolutionary regime holders. The participation of several groups in the Green Movement 
is an accumulation of these ideas and people alienated from the Islamic Republic. The 
economic and political mismanagement of the IRI’s government, along with state 
repression, provide political opportunities for this generation. The previous government’s 
reaction to the Student Movement and the current violent repression of the Green 
Movement whose members have demanded their stolen political rights testify to the 
growing effects of social movements on Iranian domestic politics. The last allegedly 
fraudulent presidential election in 2009 also shows the weakness of the regime and its 
legitimacy. 
Two theses, “Achieving the Unexpected: Social Change in Iran since 1963” 33 by 
Jenny Lo in 2010 and “Social Movements’ Emergence and Form: The Green Movement 
in Iran”34 by Afsanneh J. Haddadian in 2012, analyze the Student and Green Movements 
in Iran and provide examples of political opportunities, mobilizing resources, and frames. 
The former thesis focuses on the successes and failures of the Student and Green 
Movements by assessing their ability to gain their objectives and sustainability against 
William A. Gamson’s “Outcome of Resolved Challenges”35 framework. Lo finds the 
Student Movement unsuccessful and the Green Movement marginally successful but 
stresses their importance on social change in Iran. The latter thesis examines the 
emergence of the Green Movement by focusing on the effects of information 
communication technologies on collective action grassroots. Haddadian finds framing as 
the most important factor for the emergence of the Green Movement, but falls short of 
explaining the consequences of the Green Movement. Neither of these works looks at the 
direct or indirect political consequences.   
While Lo and Haddadian analyze the Student and Green Movements with three 
components of social movement theory, “The Rhythmic Beat of the Revolution in Iran” 
by Michael M. J. Fischer points to Shi’a Islam’s values, symbols, stories, and practices as 
33 Jenny Lo, “Achieving the Unexpected: Social Change in Iran since 1963” (Wesleyan University, 
2010). 
34 Afsanneh J. Haddadian, “Social Movements’ Emergence and Form: The Green Movement in Iran” 
(PhD diss., Wright State University, 2012). 
35 Lo, “Achieving the Unexpected,” 36. 
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 the repeating frames of Iranian social movements. He explains how the participants of the 
Green Movement place their martyrs next to the Shi’a Imam, Ali, in their fight against 
the injustice of the IRI’s government.36 He argues that the Green Movement 
demonstrates Iranians' insistence for more freedom and participation. 
The literature about the 1999 Student Movement in the optimistic camp has 
several scholarly articles that provide information on how political opportunities first 
enabled students to build organizations and how the erosion of rights, with state 
repression, mobilized these organizations after the election of President Khatami. “The 
Revival of the Student Movement in Post-Revolutionary Iran” explains the importance of 
university campuses as a mobilizing resource and free space, the crucial role of students 
in social movements, and the re-creation of student organizations in the IRI after the long 
period of the “Islamization project.”37 Six years after this article, Ali Afshari and H. 
Graham Underwood support the same point of view and provide more information about 
student activism in Iran, up to the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s presidency.38  
Scholars like Jahangir Amuzegar,39 Ray Takeyh,40 Said A. Arjomand,41 Ali 
Rezaei,42 and Arshin Adib-Monghaddam43 analyze several dimensions of the Student 
Movement and Khatami period, and generally conclude that the Student Movement was 
the first strike of social dissent against the regime’s legitimacy and arbitrary rule. 
Although it was suppressed by the state, and conservatives managed to replace a 
reformist in the presidency and later in the parliament, these movements unleashed the 
36 Michael M. J. Fischer, “The Rhythmic Beat of the Revolution in Iran,” Cultural Anthropology 25, 
no. 3, (2010), 509. 
37 Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 15 (2001), 292. 
38 Ali Afshari and H. Graham Underwood, “Iran’s Resilient Civil Society: The Student Movement’s 
Struggle,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 4 (2007), 80. 
39 Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran’s Theocracy Under Siege,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 1 (2003), 135.  
40 Takeyh, “Iran at a Crossroads.” 
41 Said A. Arjomand,  “Civil Society and the Rule of Law in the Constitutional Politics of Iran Under 
Khatami,” Social Research 67, no. 2 (2000), 283. 
42 Ali Rezaei, “Last Efforts of Iranian’s Reformists,” Middle East Report 226 (2003), 40. 
43 Arshin Adib-Monghaddam, “The Pluralistic Momentum in Iran and the Future of the Reform 
Movement,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2006), 665. 
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 pluralism among society and the ruling elite. The students became one of the reference 
points for ordinary Iranians to ask who to vote for and why. The Student Movement 
changed public opinion and political disclosures in the IRI. 
Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr indicate other aspects of the students, such as the 
growing number of educated youth, their problems, and new interpretations of Islam, in 
their two books. Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics,44 edited by Ali 
Gheissari, examines several aspects of youth in Iran. The book is a good source with 
statistical data on the growing number of educated women in Iran. It shows their 
unemployment and political problems. Another problem of Iranian youth discussed in 
this book, addiction, demonstrates the inability of Islamic law and governance to solve 
moral problems in the IRI. Vali Nasr emphasizes the new interpretation of Islam in the 
Middle East. He suggests that many young Iranians advocate this new version of Islam 
that mixes Islam and Western ideas of freedom and modernity, which will defeat 
extremism in the future.45  
“Change of Human Rights Perspective in Iran” and “Support for Democracy in 
Iran,” the first systematic analysis of support for democracy in the IRI, strongly justify 
Vali Nasr’s argument. In the first article, Hassan Davoodifard presents the development 
of human rights, its global and Islamic interpretation, and signs of change in IRI.46 Using 
data from two surveys done in 2005 and 2008, the second article argues that, while 
religiosity and old age negatively relates to democracy in the IRI, education, young age, 
and economic grievances indirectly promote democracy in Iran. Greater dissatisfaction 
with the regime increases the demand for democracy in Iran.47 
44 Ali Gheissari, ed., Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
45 Vali Nasr, The Rise of Islamic Capitalism: Why the Muslim Middle Class is the Key to Defeating 
Extremism (New York: Free Press, 2009), 201. 
46 Hassan Davoodifard and Jayum Anak Jawan, “Change of Human Rights Perspective in Iran,” 
International Journal of Business and Social Science 2, no. 7 (2011), 126. 
47 Gunes Murat Tezcur, Taghi Azadarmaki, Mehri Bahar and Hooshang Nayebi, “Support for 
Democracy in Iran,” Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 2 (2011), 232. 
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 Finally, three books about the Green Movement, one occasional paper, and three 
individual articles about Iranian politics cover the Iranian 2009 election crisis, the causes 
of the Green Movement, its dynamics, its participants’ demands, and the movement’s 
results in depth. Gunes Murat Tezcur suggests that the 2009 election fraud and the 
Supreme Leader’s partisan behavior on the side of Ahmadinejad proved “the failure of 
managed functionalism in Iran.”48 In summary, these resources argue that the huge 
numbers of different groups, even uniformed soldiers, involved in the Green Movement, 
and the continuance of peaceful protests against violent repression, demonstrate the 
Iranians' unity and commitment to liberation. The Islamic practices and rhetoric once 
again framed an Islamic identity with a modern vision. Internet and SMS texting became 
a means of free information sharing against government-manipulated media. The Green 
Movement did not, however, radicalize yet. It did not manage to change the 2009 election 
results and lost its intensity over time. It did, though, manage to put a huge question mark 
on the regime’s legitimacy. Its presence, even in very small numbers, terrifies the regime 
holders. 
D. OVERVIEW 
Chapters II-IV analyze three major social movements in Iran and their outcomes, 
and summarizes how social movements in post-revolutionary Iran have affected the IRI 
by their outcomes, which has altered domestic politics and encouraged more liberal 
tendencies. Chapter II explains how the 1979 Iranian revolution and its outcomes planted 
the seeds of the new social movements, since the revolution was the beginning of the 
Iranian contemporary state structure and its long-lasting social, economic, and political 
problems. Chapter III explains how the seeds started to sprout within the Student 
Movement in 1999, during the reformist period in Iran after the Iran-Iraq War, and 
affected Iranian domestic politics and society irreversibly. Chapter IV analyzes the 
emergence of neoconservatives in Iran with President Ahmadinejad, and explains how 
the last social movement, the Green Movement in 2009, affected Iranian domestic 
politics. Last, the findings of each chapter are summarized in Chapter V.  
48 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “Iran’s Presidential Election: The Failure of Managed Functionalism,” Insight 
Turkey 11, no. 3 (2009), 13. 
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 II. IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND SEEDS OF NEW SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS  
The Iranian revolution in 1979 planted the seeds of new social movements in 
post-revolutionary Iran. At the very least, the revolution set the foundations on which 
future movements must operate. The protests against the Shah Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi’s monarchy were a successful revolutionary social movement, in which almost 
all existing social classes participated under the leadership of Shi’a clergy. When the 
Shah was deposed, Iranians demanded better economic conditions, more liberty, more 
political rights, and protection of their Islamic values, but the consequences of the 
revolution were different.  
The Shi’a clergy, utilizing their leadership and maintaining it after the protests, 
dominated the fledgling Iranian government’s institutions and founded a state for their 
own interests instead of the Iranians’ collective wellbeing. The new regime was created 
as an Islamic Republic, a theocracy with semi-democratic institutions. By creation, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran was based on both divine and popular legitimacy. It had 
unelected and elected institutions, the former of which undermined the latter’s affairs. 
Although the unelected body maintained this superiority over the elected part, popular 
legitimacy provided an opportunity for oppositional groups to demand change in this 
system, even as the unelected institutions rejected liberal reform efforts and ended the 
political participation of oppositional groups. The Shi’a clergy separated immediately 
after the revolution, and this division deepened especially after the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, offering a second opportunity to the opposition. Elections in Iran served as an 
occasional political opportunity for new oppositional groups, both by relaxing state 
repression and enabling institutional access. The new regime could not solve Iranians’ 
economic problems, severely suppressed any opposition to Shi’a clergy, and caused 
erosion of many Iranians’ rights. Under these problems and repression, new oppositional 
groups emerged including reformist clergy, intellectuals, youth, students, and women. 
The developmental policies of the new regime helped these groups to increase their 
organizational capabilities and links, even though the Iranian government banned formal 
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 dissident political activism. Shi’a Islam, its daily practices, and its historical struggle for 
justice became a foremost frame for new social movements after the Iranian revolution, 
because the revolution created a new Islamic identity; the new regime integrated religion 
with governance, and Shi’a clergy forced an Islamization of society. 
The new social movements in Iran, especially after the death of the revolution’s 
charismatic leader and end of the Iran-Iraq war, started to utilize these opportunities. The 
Iranian revolution was not over, in the sense that the struggle of Iranians for a more 
liberal government and society was continuing. Even though the Shi’a clergy contained 
oppositional forces for nearly two decades in the post-revolutionary period, the new 
regime’s state structure and policies were preparing the necessary conditions for those 
new oppositional forces.  
A. THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND IRANIANS’ DEMANDS  
It is necessary to briefly look at how the revolution happened, how it succeeded 
against a strong monarchy with an intact security force, and what the protesters 
demanded to better understand why the revolution’s consequences created new social 
movements in Iran. First and foremost, the protests between 1977 and 1979 in Iran were a 
“multi-class populist movement,”49 which had grown with the help of Shi’a clergy and 
Iranian bazaaries’ (i.e., merchants’) mobilization capabilities, such as their autonomous 
organizational networks and resources50 that brought masses of the people, from all strata 
of Iranian society, to the streets of Iranian cities.  The social classes participating in the 
revolutionary protests were Shi’a clergy, bazaaries, university and seminary students, 
intellectuals, urban middle class, workers, women, poor from shantytowns, and even 
religious and ethnic minorities.51  The protests were a reaction to the last Shah’s 
developmental policies that were threatening a majority of its population and creating a 
volatile political environment. Second, limited relaxation of state repression along with 
49 Berch Berberoglu, “The Class Nature of Religion and Religious Movements; A Critical Analysis of 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979,” Humanity & Society 25, no. 3–4 (2001), 300. 
50 Benjamin Smith, “Collective Action with and without Islam,” 188. 
51 Ervand Abrahamian, “The Crowd in the Iranian Revolution,” Radical History Review 105 (2009), 
14. 
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 international developments opened a little protest door, and then state repression, 
inconsistent concessions, and critical events expanded the protests.52  The Shah’s security 
forces stayed intact and were able to crush the protesters during the events, but Iranians 
perceived their own opportunities; as Charles Kruzman noted in his article, “Iranians 
continued to recognize and fear the state’s coercive powers. However, they felt that these 
powers were insignificant compared with the strength of revolutionary movement.”53 
Finally, the revolutionary movement succeeded because of non-violent tactics and 
continuous protests, with the help of Shi’a Islam’s forty-day mourning rituals that 
produced protest cycles whenever the state killed protesters. The Iranian state was 
paralyzed by general strikes, and the Shah’s regime fell apart when unarmed people 
overcame the modern Iranian military with flowers.  
Although the demands of protesters varied during the two years, the aim of the 
revolutionary movement was chanted as “independence, liberty, and Islamic republic.”54 
The Iranians, as an end state, wanted to set up a new regime in order to achieve “political 
freedom, essential rights and political independence and in this way to establish Islam 
and Islamic cultural values in society and create an Islamic government so that there 
would not be poverty and economic deprivation”55 due to their high dissatisfaction with 
the Shah’s monarchic regime. However, the result would be much different even at the 
very beginning of the post-revolutionary period. As Mehdi Bazargan, the provisional 
Prime Minister of Iran, put it, “We were asking for rain instead we got flood … What has 
the ruling elite done … besides bringing death and destruction, packing the prisons and 
cemeteries in every city, creating long queues, shortage, high prices, unemployment, 
52 Karen Rasler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution,” American 
Sociological Review 61, no. 1 (February 1996), 132. 
53 Charles Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social Movement Theory: 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979,” American Sociological Review 61, no. 1 (February 1996), 161. 
54  Farhad Khosrokavar, “The Islamic Revolution in Iran: Retrospect after a Quarter of a Century,” 
Thesis Eleven 76, no. 70 (2004), accessed July 24, 2013, http://the.sagepub.com/content/76/1/70, 71. 
55 Hamidreza Jalaeipour, “Iran’s Islamic Revolution: Achievements and Failures,” Critique: Critical 
Middle Eastern Studies 15, no. 3 (2006), 210.  
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 poverty, homeless people, repetitious slogans and a dark future?”56 The situation has not 
improved much in the three decades since the revolution, but it has created new 
opportunities and threats for emerging dissident groups.   
B. CREATION OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS FOR 
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
The Iranian revolution changed the state structure of Iran from a constitutional 
monarchy to a theocracy with semi-democratic institutions, which was called an Islamic 
Republic. This new state structure was a system for clergy, as Farhad Kazemi has 
asserted: “Iranian politics is a system made by clerics for the clerics, and for their 
supporters who possess a near monopoly on the spoils of the revolution and the country’s 
resources.”57 However, it has also produced political opportunities and threats for 
oppositional groups by its foundation of dual legitimacy that combined theocracy and 
democracy with a high degree of authoritarianism and economic problems. 
Fundamentally, the dual legitimacy and the elite conflict offered continuous opportunities 
in Iran, where elections served as an occasional political opportunity. State repression, 
state-attributed economic problems, and the erosion of rights were three other motives 
that would mobilize dissident groups against the regime.  
1. Dual Legitimacy 
The revolution provided the fundamental continuous opportunity for new social 
movements with its dual legitimacy, in which the revolutionary clergy based their 
position in the system on divine rule with the absence of the last Imam, and justified this 
claim by the popular demand of Iranians. Initially, at the end of March 1979, 97 percent 
of the Iranian electorate voted for an Islamic Republic that Ayatollah Khomeini 
proclaimed as an unprecedented referendum in Iranian history.58 The provisional 
56 Mahmoud Kashefi, “Why the 1979 Iranian Revolution Did Not Bring an Advanced Mode of 
Production with a Representative and Reduced State Power? A Sociological Explanation,” International 
Review of Modern Sociology 34, no. 1 (Spring 2008), 76.  
57 Farhad  Kazemi, “The Precarious Revolution,” 82. 
58 R. K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Revolution: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects,” International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International affairs 1944-) 56, no. 3 (Summer 1980), 449. 
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 government, however, could not provide a full democratic Islamic government to 
Iranians. Although the government promised a “Constituent Assembly,”59 which would 
have been an elected body of representatives that could have provided a better 
opportunity for a representative public debate on the new constitution, an “Assembly of 
Experts”60 was elected by a decree of Khomeini. The 75 elected members of the 
Assembly, who were the supporters of Khomeini, produced and approved the IRI’s 
constitution, which was ratified in a referendum on November 15, 1979 and amended in 
1989. The Iranian constitution described the government with its first article,  “Article 1: 
The form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic, endorsed by the people of 
Iran on the basis of their long standing belief in the sovereignty of truth and Qur’anic 
justice.”61 Various groups opposed the procedural and substantive flaws of this process, 
but the new constitution created the Islamic Republic based on the concept of wilayat al-
faqih. 62 
While the constitution established an Islamic government and took its support 
from Iranians as described in Article 1, the IRI’s constitutional duality of theocracy and 
republicanism came from the concept of wilayat al-faqih and consists of elected and 
appointed institutions, as shown in Figure 1.   
59 R. K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Revolution: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects,” 450. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, Evolving Iran, 58. 
62 Ibrahim Moussawi, Shi’ism and the Democratization Process in Iran, 7. 
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Figure 1.  The IRI’s Political System.63 
The Iranian constitution’s Article 5 changed the nature of the Islamic democratic 
state to more of a theocracy by giving absolute right of rule to the religious leader or 
authorities by stating that, “during the occultation of the Lord of the age (May God hasten 
his renewed manifestation!) the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the 
just and pious faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, 
resourceful and administrative ability; and recognized and accepted by the majority of the 
people. In the event that no faqih should be so recognized by the majority, the leader or 
the leadership council, composed of fuqaha possessing the aforementioned qualifications 
will assume this responsibility in accordance with article 107.”64  
63 David E.Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyad, 23. 
64 Riaz Hassan, “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionaries: Before and After the Revolution,” Third World 
Quarterly 6, no. 3 (July 1984), 682. 
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 In this complex political system, the appointed institutions like Guardian Council 
and Expediency Council under the personal control of the Supreme Leader have 
challenged, undermined, and overridden the elected president and parliament (Majles) to 
secure the future of the regime and sustain their political and economic interests, instead 
of promoting better governance and equal distribution of wealth to Iranians. Since the 
Supreme Leader was the head of the system with his extensive authority to decide the 
general policies, supervise their execution, and ratify or appoint the top officials 
including the president as well as being the commander in chief,65 he could easily deny 
the president's policies such as liberal reforms that would challenge his interests. In 
addition to the Supreme Leader's powerful role in undermining the popularly elected 
president, the Guardian Council which was the other most powerful body and an 
extension of the Supreme Leader's personal will, with its appointed members has 
continually obstructed the work of the elected members of the legislature body, the 
Majles. The Guardian Council’s job, to ensure that all legislation is compatible with 
Islam, intensified the same legitimacy problem since the unelected and elected assemblies 
clashed often, especially on reform issues. The Council vetoed the laws developed in the 
Majles if the members of the council found them contrary to Shi’a Islam. The Guardian 
Council also supervised elections, vetted, and vetoed the candidates according to Article 
99 of the Constitution. The creation of the Guardian Council in Iranian politics dated 
back to the constitutional period, with the idea of safeguarding “the Islamic ordinance 
and the constitution;”66 its de-facto control, however, began with the Islamic Republic. 
Contrary to the general argument of many scholars that saw this unelected body 
of the Iranian political system as an impenetrable obstacle for more liberal democratic 
politics, the undermining of elected institutions and unjust affairs of these institutions 
started to damage the Iranian state’s divine legitimacy in the minds and hearts of the 
Iranian public. The state oppression and rigidity against any other group and different 
ideas left one way to challenge the regime holders’ arbitrary rule by utilizing the popular 
legitimacy of the political system. 
65 David E.Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, 25. 
66 Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, Evolving Iran, 65. 
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 2. Division of the Elite 
The Iranian new elite dominated all institutions of the system and suppressed 
other revolutionary groups for nearly two decades, beginning from the early years of the 
revolution and during the Iran-Iraq war; several divisions, however, occurred among 
them mainly between conservatives and reformers. The second opportunity for new 
social movements in Iran, the post-revolutionary elite conflict, occurred first when 
different power centers emerged after the revolution. The initial polarization started 
“around the nature of the Islamic state”67and later continued on the development and 
reform issues related to the economic problems. The major political power centers in the 
early months of the post-revolution period were “the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government led by Mehdi Bazargan, the Revolutionary Council appointed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the Komitehs and Shawras, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), the 
Islamic Courts, and the Mujahedin-i Khalq.”68 Although the provisional government was 
responsible for reconstruction of the state and was led by the National Front, including 
devout religious figures like Ayatollah Talegani and their supporters from among 
Western-educated intellectuals and technocrats, the traditional clerics and Ulema 
dominated the Revolutionary Council, Komitehs and Shawras at the national and regional 
levels, and with the support of the Revolutionary Guards. The former group wanted to 
build a modern Islamic government compatible with democracy, which would forge a 
modern society, but the latter group saw their position and ideas as “antithetical to the 
objectives of the revolution.”69 The constitution gave absolute power to traditional clergy 
by designating, implicitly, Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Leader with its Article 
107.70 Soon after, the conservative clergy showed its first willingness to wield power 
when the Supreme Leader dismissed the first elected President, Dr. Abdul Hassan Bani 
Sadr, who was a member of the pre-revolution liberation movement.  
67 Riaz Hassan, “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionaries: Before and After the Revolution,” 676. 
68 Ibid., 677. 
69 Ibid., 679. 
70 Eric Hoglund and William Royce, “The Shi’i Clergy of Iran the Conception of an Islamic State,” 
State, Culture, and Society 1, no. 3 (Spring 1985), 107. 
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 3. Elections 
Elections in Iran after the revolution became an occasional political opportunity 
for relaxing state repression and enabling institutional access for opposition groups, 
through reformist clergy, to change the system to more liberal ways. The Islamic 
Republic, on the other hand, has seen the elections as justification of the legitimacy of the 
regime from the first referendum on. In Article 6, the constitution states, “In the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of public 
opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the election of President, the 
representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the members of councils.”71 
The increased public participation in elections has justified both the legitimacy of the 
Islamic government and the strength of the revolution for conservatives. Although the 
Guardian Council qualified or vetoed all candidates, the Iranian regime relaxed state 
repression during election periods, thus providing a limited free space for political 
discussions in front of the public. The elections also provided institutional access for only 
reformist clergy because of their revolutionary and Islamic credentials to change the 
system in more liberal ways.     
4. Threats 
While the new Islamic regime was producing political opportunities for 
oppositional groups on the one hand, it also created threats such as state repression, state-
attributed economic problems, and the erosion of rights that mobilize Iranians to protest. 
State repression was pervasive in the new regime’s policies to sustain the Islamic 
character of the revolution. The new regime could not solve the economic problems as 
the clergy had promised before the revolution but, rather, increased them because of the 
devastating effects of war and mismanagement of the economy. Many Iranians such as 
secular technocrats, intellectuals, women, and even liberal-minded religious clergy lost 
their rights.  
71 Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, Evolving Iran, 83. 
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 a. State Repression 
The new regime did not hesitate to destroy other revolutionary groups, and 
continued state repression from the beginning of its creation to secure and sustain the 
Islamic character of the revolution and the new regime. The first three years of the post-
revolution period were bloody. At least 10,000 people were killed during the political 
struggles.72 Although major organized participants of the revolution such as the 
“Movement for the Liberation of Iran,”73 Tudeh party, and radical organizations like “the 
Cherikha-yi Fedayi Khalq (The People’s Devoted Guerillas) and the Sazman-i 
Mujahidin-i Khalq (The Organization of the People’s Fighters)”74 contributed to the 
struggle against the Shah, these forces became a threat to the conservative clergy. 
Especially, the activities of Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq, including bombings and 
assassinations that killed many political leaders of the new regime, testified to this threat 
and justified the use of force against these organizations. Khomeini unleashed the 
Revolutionary Guards and Komitehs, with their arsenal that had been taken from the 
Shah’s security forces, to destroy the new regime’s rivals. Moreover, there were 
individuals among the Shi’a clergy who challenged the leadership of Khomeini. For 
example, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari was Khomeini’s strongest rival with his religious 
credentials and popularity among Shi’a clergy.75 Khomeini and his supporters silenced 
them, either by discrediting them or putting them under house arrest. Eventually, between 
November 1979 and April 1983, the conservative clergy brutally destroyed all its 
organized and individual opponents.76 This state repression continued by imprisoning 
any secular or liberal opposition to the theocratic regime. Political freedom, freedom of 
speech, and freedom of the press and association only worked in favor of conservative 
clergy and their lay supporters.   
72 Hamidreza Jalaeipour, “Iran’s Islamic Revolution: Achievements and Failures,” 210. 
73 Ervand Abrahamian, “The Opposition Forces,” MERIP Reports 75/76 (March-April 1979), 5. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Eric Hoglund and William Royce, “The Shi’i Clergy of Iran,” 112. 
76 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 154. 
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 b. State-Attributed Economic Problems 
In addition to political struggles, the new elite of the Islamic Republic also 
confronted old economic problems of the Shah’s time that were rooted in the 1973 oil-
boom’s economic and financial mess. The revolutionary period also added “loss of 
management and capital, labor radicalism, bankruptcies, and shortages of raw 
materials”77 to previous problems. The economic problem was urgent, with more than 
two million unemployed in Iran immediately after the revolution.78 To solve these 
problems, Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters ran the economy in a way that shifted 
its priorities from economic growth to social and economic justice, and economic policy 
turned in anti-market, anti-capitalist, and anti-globalist directions.79 Although personal 
income has increased by half since 1980, the Islamic Republic created its economic 
structures related to revolutionary ideology and Islamic rules of social justice. The 
country’s new constitution led the government to reduce poverty, to ban usury and 
extravagance, to aim for self-sufficiency in food production, and to prevent foreign 
economic domination, especially in the oil industry. The government nationalized major 
industries, private banks, and insurance companies. Thousands of businesses belonging to 
the Shah and his supporters were turned over to Islamic charitable foundations, 
“bonyads.” Moreover, Ayatollah Khomeini founded the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) to defend the new regime, providing welfare and small loans to veterans 
and their families during the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq war. The economic consequences of the 
war years were severe, not only because of the destruction but also because of huge 
nationalization, migration of middle-class Iranians, and the decline in international oil 
prices. Per capita GDP and capital formation declined by one third, and inflation 
accelerated to nearly 20 percent between 1980 and 1988.80 State-attributed economic 
problems continued but have never been solved in Iran. 
77 Vahe Petrossian, “Dilemmas of the Iranian Revolution,” The World Today 36, no. 1 (1980), 25. 
78 Ibid. 
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80 Ibid., 142. 
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 c. Erosion of Rights 
Many Iranians, such as secular technocrats, intellectuals, women, and even 
liberal-minded religious clergy, lost their rights rather than gaining more liberties. Every 
type of human rights violation had been widespread in Iran before the revolution. The 
Shah prohibited self-expression and political participation. Press censorship climbed to 
the level where no newspapers, magazines, or other publications was printed within the 
country if contained even the slightest government criticism.81 The Iranian Army and 
SAVAK’s arrests, detentions, torture, and murders had become severe; even the Shah’s 
laws, which gave extensive authority to SAVAK to deal with anti-regime activities just 
before the revolution, were draconian. The new regime did little to significantly improve 
human rights. Human rights violations continued, both because of “perceived threats to 
[the] regime and a specific interpretation of Islam.”82 As noted earlier, the first victims of 
these violations were secular and liberal intellectuals, upon the excuse of their threats to 
the regime. Their few rights were eroded completely compared to the monarchic regime’s 
standards. Although the new regime ensured the Iranians’ rights extensively, ranging 
from equal rights for every citizen, protection of the law for every individual, freedom to 
gather publicly, and even the right of executing street marches in accordance with the 
articles from 19 to 42 in the IRI’s constitution, it limited them by insisting that they 
comply with Islamic principles.83 So, women became the second losers because Islamic 
law never considers women equal to men. In addition to Islamic principles, the conditions 
of some rights, such as freedom of the press and freedom of speech, complied with the 
basis of Islamic government, which jeopardized even the Shi’a clergy’s rights if they 
would criticize the Islamic government and the regime holders would see them as a 
threat. Numerous incidents occurred in Iran that would initiate protests because of the 
erosion of rights.     
81 Ahmad Faroughy, “Repression in Iran,” Index on Censorship 3, no. 4 (1974), 15. 
82 Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, Evolving Iran, 115. 
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 C. POST-REVOLUTIONARY MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND 
RESOURCES   
Under this state oppression, new oppositional groups emerged, such as the 
reformist elite, intellectuals, youth, students, and women. First, the reformist elite 
separated from the conservative clergy and became the natural leader of oppositional 
groups, since they appealed to intellectuals, youth, and women with their political 
position in the absence of party politics and where the Shi’a clerics were, as Ayatollah 
Rafsanjani has said, the “main guiding force for political activity in the country.”84 They 
were the only leaders who could participate in political competition. Both religious and 
secular intellectuals were the second opposition group in post-revolutionary Iranian 
society, with their role in opening up cultural domains and pushing modernization and 
liberation by both their reinterpretation of Shi’a Islam and showing other fields of 
intellectual life where religion could not claim supremacy. The number of publications 
increased. With the high population growth rate of Iran, a new generation of youth 
emerged. These young Iranians, both boys and girls, were far removed from 
revolutionary ideology and more educated than their elders, due to the new regime’s 
developmental policies on education. They suffered under the new regime’s self-inflicted 
economic problems and repression more than they would have during the Shah’s regime. 
They became more politically active, first in schools with student organizations, and later 
continued this activism in their lives through their informal links and loose organizations. 
Student organizations that were formerly built by the new regime to support the 
Islamization of education and society turned to opposition organizations in the freer 
environment of universities. Art associations, student trade unions, and political student 
organizations emerged on Iranian campuses. Women’s solidarity networks and non-
governmental organizations also were founded and contributed to the social mobilization. 
The Islamic government’s infrastructural developments both changed the face of urban 
centers to more modern places and helped these groups’ communication and 
organizational capabilities by extending electricity, telephone, roads, and other available 
84 Reza Razavi, “The Road to Party Politics in Iran: 1979-2009,” 85. 
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 technological means, such as TV, Internet, and social media, even in remote areas of the 
country.   
1. Reformist Elite 
The post-revolutionary elite conflict during the first years of the Islamic Republic 
deepened and varied over two decades in Iran, and the reformist clergy became the 
vanguard of social movements, since they promoted a more moderate and inclusive rule 
with redistributive economic policies, and the political system did not allow any outsider 
institutional access. As a result of the post-revolutionary political power struggle and 
intra-elite conflict which caused the closure of the country’s last political party, the 
Islamic Republic Party, in May 1987,85 the revolutionary elite divided into three major 
factions, especially after the death of Khomeini. There were traditional conservatives, 
pragmatist conservatives or the pragmatic right and reformers.86 These factions used 
mosques, seminaries, and their informal links, such as economic or intellectual relations, 
to encourage political participation in a way other than formal political parties although 
the IRI’s constitution allowed the formation of political parties. This was as a result of the 
lack of development of party politics in Iran after the regime change. Whereas traditional 
and pragmatic conservatives preferred a protective policy on wilayat al-faqih with 
populist and protectionist or to some extent market-oriented economic policies, the 
reformist elite sought to moderate clerical rule by strengthening civil institutions. Their 
policy position was more liberal and inclusive, with redistributive economic tendencies. 
Thus, Iranian intellectuals, youth, women, and even minority groups started to support 
the reformist faction.  Moreover, the reformist clergy were the only political leaders who 
could pass the strict qualifications of the Guardian Council. The reformist elite’s religious 
credentials and revolutionary commitment helped them to compete in the elections as 
presidential and representative candidates.  
85 Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 65. 
86 Keith Crane, Rollie Lal, and Jeffrey Martini, Iran’s Political, Demographic, and Economic 
Vulnerabilities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 21. 
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 2. Intellectuals 
Iranian intellectuals played a crucial role in the emergence of new opposition 
groups, by opening up their cultural domains and pushing modernization and liberation. 
Religious intellectuals were the frontrunners of the new ideas that would undermine the 
foundations of the divine legitimacy of theocracy.87 The reinterpretation of Shi’a Islam 
on “theology, jurisprudence, clerical institutions, and the fusion of religion and state”88 
came from both within and outside the Islamic government’s formal establishment. For 
example, Muhammad Khatami, who was also in the leadership of new social movements 
and Adbolkarim Soroush were the members of the first parliament. Iranian secular 
intellectuals also contributed to the opening of society by showing other fields of 
intellectual life where religion could not claim supremacy such as cinema, theatre, 
painting, novel writing, and poetry. The number of publications increased with the efforts 
of intellectuals. Many works of those intellectuals won prizes in European festivals or 
Western awards. The themes of Iranian cinema were not religious, or at least religious 
figures were acting with non-religious goals.89 The religious intellectuals tried to 
secularize the religion and to widen the scope of human intervention in politics, 
challenging the idea of conservatives that they only suggested and took “an intangible 
political order ordained by God.”90 Secular intellectuals showed that religion was only 
another activity among other kinds of cultural activities.     
3. Youth 
The Iranian population growth rate created an expansion in the younger segment 
of the population, which did not experience the pre-revolutionary period but suffered 
from the economic problems and state repression of the new regime.  The younger 
generation was educated by the new regime’s developmental policies on education. The 
new generation’s main concerns were living a life without the restrictions of Islamic law, 
87 Farhad Khosrokhavar, “The Islamic Revolution in Iran,” 77. 
88 Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 84.  
89 Farhad Khosrokhavar, “The Islamic Revolution in Iran,” 79. 
90 Ibid. 
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 achieving personal economic and social goals, having free formal relations with the 
opposite sex, consuming without guilt the developing world’s modern goods, and the 
like, rather than advocating the old revolutionary ideology and its forced daily 
Islamization.91 The new regime in Iran both increased the number of schools and 
students. With the compulsory usage of the scarf by women and girls, and the segregation 
of boys and girls in education, Iranian girls were allowed to go to school. The new 
generation first became more politically active in these schools with student 
organizations. Among the youth, students were the most affected by and aware of the 
Iranian problems since they were educated in an environment where they were influenced 
by the new intellectuals. Women, as a part of the student group, became the other foot 
soldiers of the social movements along with their separate struggle to gain their lost civil 
rights and overcome inequality. The more women were educated, the more they realized 
the inequality between female and male in Iranian society.  
4. Mobilizing Resources 
While a new generation was getting educated, the Islamic Republic’s 
developmental policies started to provide necessary resources for mobilizing structures, 
such as communication means, and modern and free spaces where groups could meet and 
interact with one another. Beginning with the Iran-Iraq War years, Iranian infrastructure 
had started to improve, at first, to provide the necessary communication and supply 
routes of war. After the war, the Iranian urban centers were in crisis since they were 
overgrown, overpopulated, polluted, unregulated, and mismanaged during the war years. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Islamic government began to reconstruct the country. 
The urban centers gradually changed into more modern cities where freeways, shopping 
malls, and commercial billboards began to appear like in Western cities. Parks, sport 
centers, concert halls, and recreational places emerged in cities beginning with Tehran.92 
Telephone, television, Internet access, and other technological devices such as cellphones 
and, more recently, smart phones or tablets were becoming available for purchase in Iran. 
91 Farhad Khosrokhavar, “The Islamic Revolution in Iran,” 76.  
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 Although the Islamic government strictly controlled these urban spaces, censored the 
press and visual media, and blocked Internet access, Iranians found ways to bypass them. 
These developments became the sources of mobilization both for organizational and 
communication means.       
D. POLITICALIZED SHI’A ISLAM AS A CENTRAL FRAME 
Shi’a Islam, its daily practices, and its historical struggle for justice became a 
primary frame for new social movements in Iran. The Iranian revolution itself created a 
new social movement’s frame with its revolutionary Islamic identity, the integration of 
religion into governance, and the Shi’a clergy’s Islamization project for society.  
One of the slogans on the walls during the Iranian revolution was “Marx, if only 
you were alive, you would see that religion is not the opium of the people.”93 Although 
Shi’a Islam does not directly advocate rebellion against the rulers, its founding origins, 
which started the Shi’a‒Sunni split in Islam, justified a meaningful struggle against 
tyranny and injustice. Three factors made the Shi’a Islam nested within the Iranian 
nationalism and socialism frame the revolutionary movement and created the 
revolutionary identity during the revolution. First, Iranians had perceived a tremendous 
threat to their indigenous values. The Shah had been forcefully secularizing the society 
and threatening his intellectually unprepared subjects’ religious values. Second, as noted 
earlier, religious spaces like mosques and seminaries had been the most prevalent places 
to organize and disseminate the slogans of the revolutionaries. Last, the stories, symbols, 
and rituals of Shi’a Islam justified a meaningful struggle against tyranny and injustice in 
Iranian culture. The myth of martyrdom in Shi’a Islam, the martyrdom of Hussein and all 
his male next of kin by Sunni caliph Yazid, was a potent theme that demonstrated corrupt 
and oppressive tyranny. This myth was and still is central to everyday life in Iran.94    
When Shia clergy built the new regime based on wilayat al faqih, the Shi’a Islam 
religion became a part of the government and opened political discussions on what is true 
93 Ervand Abrahamian, “The Crowd in the Iranian Revolution,” 24. 
94 Jill Diane Swenson, “Martyrdom: Mytho-Cathexis and the Mobilization of the Masses in the Iranian 
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 or not according to Shi’a Islamic principles by individual reasoning. Although the Shi’a 
clerical establishment in Iran dates back to the Safavid Empire, which established Shi’a 
Islam as the government’s official ideology, Shi’ism was not politicized and 
institutionalized to its current extent in Iran before the revolution. The clergy had gained 
political, social, and economic privileges before, and Iranian Shahs had coordinated 
government policies with clergy and safeguarded Shi’a Islam to gain legitimacy for 
centuries;95 the clergy, however, had never become a part of the government. Instead, 
Shi’a clerics stayed mainly independent and alongside the state authority. The 
politicization of Shi’a Islam started especially with the ideas of Sayyed Jalal Al-e Ahmad 
and Ali Shari’ati, who created a religious and national stance by defining the former 
situation in Iran as “Westoxification”96 and later transforming Islam into an ideology that 
could rise up against the injustices of the Pahlavi Shahs.97 While their ideas were 
becoming popular among pre-revolutionary intellectuals and seminary students, 
Khomeini built his concept of wilayat al-faqih with a revolutionary resistance to an 
unjust Shah. It was the foundation of the Islamic Republic that formally politicized Shi’a 
Islam and integrated it into governance.  The more the government used Shi’a Islamic 
principles and laws to rule Iran and solve Iranians’ contemporary problems, the more it 
became an open arena for political discussions. The faults of the government and 
mismanagement or unequal distribution of resources can be easily matched with injustice 
and delegitimize the new rulers.     
The conservative clergy who built the Islamic government and politicized Shi’a 
Islam did not stop at the state level but started a cultural revolution in Iran in order to 
clean away the remnants of the Shah’s secularization; it was this effort that would 
backfire. From governmental institutions to Iranians’ clothes, the revolutionaries dictated 
Islamic principles and forced them on society. For example, universities in Iran closed in 
1980, and their curriculum was rearranged according to Islamic standards between 1980 
95 Mehdi Khalaji, “Iran’s Regime of Religion,” Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (2011), 131. 
96 Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, 73. 
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 and 1983.98  “Workplaces, factories, banks and hospitals became sites of moral 
prescription; sex segregation and daily collective prayers were imposed by law and 
enforced by hard-line Islamic associations.”99 Revolutionary posters and slogans 
decorated all streets. Citizens were even reminded of their religious duties and the new 
social order by loudspeakers. The Islamization project was forced on all social life in Iran 
to build an Islamic identity but, as noted earlier, this forced Islamization was accepted 
with different interpretations, if not totally reversed. The new generation took Shi’a Islam 
with their individual world views. Although Islamization was enforced in Iran, however, 
religiosity declined, drug use increased, and prostitution skyrocketed in the late 1990s. 
Since the government’s strict control continued on Islamic daily practices, new social 
movements could not show their resistance by wearing Western style clothes or totally 
rejecting Islamization. Rather, they found innovative ways to challenge the regime 
holders by using the revolutionary period’s tactics, such as using the same protest 
methods.       
E. CONCLUSION 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was the starting point of new social movements in 
Iran. The IRI’s dual legitimacy, division among the revolutionary elite, and elections 
provided continuous and occasional opportunities through the foundation of the new 
regimes’ complex political system. The Islamic government’s authoritarianism and 
economic problems that created state repression, state-attributed economic problems, and 
the erosion of rights also became motivation for opposition groups to start protests. Given 
their privileged position as the only group to have institutional access and their political 
status, the reformist clergy became the vanguard and only hope for opposition groups in 
Iran. New intellectuals, youth, students, and women composed the participants of these 
social movements. They utilized their informal linkages and informal organizations in 
lieu of political parties and very limited formal opposition organizations in Iran. The 
Iranian government’s developmental policies and progress provided new resources for 
98 Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 288. 
99 Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, 56. 
 35 
                                                 
 these mobilizing groups.  Shi’a Islam as an integral part of the government became an 
open area of debate. Its forced daily religious practices in society framed the social 
movements. The Iranian students allying with the reformist elite were the first ones who 
used the seeds of the new social movements in Iran. Their struggle did not end but grew, 
and the Green Movement happened as the last collective effort of Iranians to liberalize 
Iran by utilizing the same opportunities and frames, in different ways.   
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 III. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND AN IRREVERSIBLE 
CHANGE 
After the Iranian revolution and absence of political opposition activism for 
nearly two decades, the Student Movement in 1999 was the first episode of new social 
movements that would become an important way to change the IRI’s regime to more 
liberal ways. Although the movement was unsuccessful since it did not achieve an 
institutional change and was suppressed immediately, students became a “focal point of 
Iran’s political developments,”100 as one newspaper put it. Although their demands and 
links to Iranian society were limited at the time of protests, the Iranian students 
demonstrated their potential to become a potent force for future pro-democracy 
movements. In addition, the movement carried the political discussions in front of the 
public and uncovered the liberal tendencies of Iranian society. When the IRI’s 
government severely attacked the students, the Islamic regime started to lose its 
legitimacy. 
The Student Movement began when the reformist elite utilized the Iranian 
political system’s various opportunities. The presidential election in 1997 was the 
occasional opportunity of the political system through which students, along with Iranian 
intellectuals, women, poor, and even minorities, supported the reformist elite and won a 
decisive victory against the conservative ruling elite. The division among the Iranian 
ruling elite had deepened significantly due to several factors, especially after the death of 
the charismatic leader of the revolution. A religiously unqualified and weak successor, 
Khamenei, became the Supreme Leader with extended powers, but President Rafsanjani’s 
reforms strengthened possible opposition groups by economic means that would signal 
possible changes in the system. After the election, the reformist president Khatami united 
a coalition of reform-minded administrators and challenged the divine legitimacy of the 
IRI. His policies relaxed state repression to some extent and encouraged the press and 
civil organizations to be more active in domestic politics. However, his reform efforts 
were curtailed by the conservative clergy, who controlled the IRI’s appointed institutions 
100 Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 284. 
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 and judiciary. While state-attributed economic problems were still in place and state 
repression undermined reform efforts, the Iranian security forces’ severe violence against 
protesters and demonstrators brought high numbers of students to the streets. Students 
were among the growing number of Iranian youth mobilized in the universities, where 
they could freely discuss the problems of the state and society. The reemergence of 
student organizations at Iranian universities enabled students to start protests, while the 
Iranian universities’ relatively free arena and student organization links helped students 
to organize. New intellectuals’ ideas framed their activism as they appealed and 
influenced the world views of students after the period of the Islamization project. 
Growing ideas of personal liberties and freedom within the ideological framework of 
Shi’a Islam framed the Student Movement.  
Although the students supported the reformist elite, who gained extensive 
institutional access between 1997 and 2004, they could not gain their rulers’ support 
when state security forces attacked students in universities. The students’ demands for 
change did not reach the other social classes in Iran at first, either. Their unity and their 
movement’s efficacy waned, but students continued their struggle for a more liberal Iran, 
both in their future lives and in universities. They would be among the foot soldiers for 
Iranian pro-democracy movements.    
A. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IN 1999 AND ITS DEMANDS 
The Student Movement in 1999 was a civil collective reaction against Iranian 
state repression and brutality on freedom of speech and assembly. The first signs of this 
movement emerged during President Khatami’s campaign, in which Iranian students 
effectively participated between February and May 1997. However, the huge 
mobilization of students in Tehran, Tabriz, and fourteen other Iranian cities beginning on 
July 7, 1999, when they protested the closure of the daily Salaam magazine, marked the 
movement’s national and international recognition.101 The protest started with the 
peaceful gathering of 200 hundred students in Tehran on the evening of July 7 to support 
freedom of speech, but they were injured, and at least five students were killed by formal 
101Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 283. 
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 security and informal “semi-clandestine pressure groups.”102 The protests grew and 
continued over the next six days with the participation of thousands of students who 
employed various protest methods ranging from street marches or violent street clashes 
against security forces to peaceful sit-ins. The IRI’s government deployed its security 
forces and anti-riot police, as well as volunteer militias, and mercilessly suppressed the 
protests. Finally, the protests ended on July 13. More than 1,500 students were arrested 
during the protests and 17 students were still in prison even two years later.  
The student demands changed during the protests and stayed limited. Their initial 
protest was against the closure of Salaam and about the press law. After the attack by 
security forces and militias, the student demands turned to “the return of victim's bodies, 
removal of the head of security forces, identification and punishment of plain clothed 
individuals (militias) involved in the raid, the accountability for the attack by the Leader, 
an apology to students for insults they were subjected to during the raid, medical and 
psychological attention for the injured, compensation for damages, and so on.”103 The IRI 
government was slow to respond to these demands. Students grew more frustrated, and 
their slogans turned more critical and radical with inconsistent demands. They even 
protested the new Supreme Leader for the first time as, “Khameinei! Shame on you; 
leadership is not for you” and “Incompetent leader of the time, is the true cause of this 
crime.”104  
B. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS  
The built-in handicaps of the IRI’s political system started to work for the Student 
movement on the behalf of new social movements. Elections, both presidential and 
parliamentary, were occasional opportunities that handed the elected institutions’ powers 
to the reformist elite, with a high percentage of popular support to change the system to 
more liberal ways. The division among the elite served as a catalyst for this victory as the 
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 traditional and pragmatic ruling elite depleted their credits in society. The economic 
reform efforts of the pragmatic faction also strengthened reform-minded technocrats and 
politicians. Building a coalition from these reformist groups and the support of the 
Iranian electorate, President Khatami challenged the divine legitimacy by promoting rule 
of law in Iran. The state repression relaxed for a limited time. However, the unelected 
institutions of the system and judiciary under the control of conservatives curtailed 
reform efforts. While economic problems were continuing, the state violence inspired 
huge numbers of students to protest. 
1. Elections 
In 1997, Iranian presidential elections for the first time handed over the most 
powerful elected institution of the Iranian political system, the presidency, to the 
reformist elite, with a strong popular legitimacy. The Iranians elected Muhammad 
Khatami, a previously little-known, middle-rank clergy member but a reformist, instead 
of the conservatives’ candidate, Nateq-Nouri, who was the speaker of the Majles, with 69 
percent of the votes.105 His landslide victory was a testimony to Iranians’, especially 
young Iranians’, demand for change since his campaign had stressed populism, economic 
growth, accountable government, rule of law, and the respect for civil rights that would 
develop a better society in Iran. Iranians believed in his sincerity and even strengthened 
him by electing 189 out of 290 Majles seats from the reformists’ candidates, giving 65 
percent of the parliamentary seats to his support.106 Although information about his 
constituency’s voting patterns was scarce, the majority of his constituency was from 
Iranian reformist intellectuals, youth, students, women, and town dwellers, as well as 
minorities.107   
The Iranian electorate had turned their backs on traditional and pragmatic 
conservatives because of two decades of disillusionment on proposed justice, equality, 
and better economic conditions. The government tried to solve the economic problems 
105 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives: The 
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 but managed nothing and did not act justly and fairly. After the death of Khomeini, the 
conservative clergy under the coalition of the new Supreme Leader Khamenei and 
pragmatist President Rafsanjani tried, between 1989 and 1997, to solve some of the 
problems of the long war years, but these efforts were insufficient. The Iranian ruling 
elite’s best excuse for delayed economic recovery and change, the Iran-Iraq war, had 
ended. Since the economic problems were the most critical ones undermining the 
revolutionary power structure by affecting its social base such as the bazaaries and lower 
classes, President Rafsanjani’s administration initiated economic reforms.”108  “A 
developmental approach within the framework of revolution”109 was necessary to change 
the revolutionary rhetoric and policies. Rafsanjani proposed reconstruction of the Iranian 
economy with “an aggressive monetary policy, an increased external debt, an increase in 
imports, an extensive privatization program, investment in infrastructure, introduction of 
free trade zones, deregulation of foreign exchange, attraction of expatriate entrepreneurial 
talents, investments, institutional reform, and introduction of development planning.”110 
His five-year development projects, however, did not cure the economic problems of 
society at all. On the contrary, Iran’s international debt grew; the inflation rate increased 
from 19 percent in 1989 to 40 percent in 1993 and stayed high; planned privatization 
turned to corruption that handed public sector industries to state-controlled foundations or 
cronies of the ruling elite. The government also increased taxation opposite to a rentier 
state’s character, which would lessen its ability to resist political opposition from society. 
For example, Iran’s tax revenues increased from 986 billion Rials in 1989 to 3,180 billion 
in 1994.111 In addition, the government had to cut its populist programs such as 
government subsidies. Price controls and market regulations were implemented and led to 
protests in Tehran, Mashad, and Qazvin. The government changed reform policy with a 
gradual approach to diminish the negative effects of economic development on the poor, 
and could not meet their planned goals. The unemployment problem was not solved and 
108 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran, 113. 
109 Ibid., 119. 
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 stayed high. Although economic problems were not the total reason for political dissent, 
the main reason most Iranians cited was primarily the economy, and politics later.112  
2. Division of Elite  
The early split in the post-revolutionary elite, which deepened after the Iran-Iraq 
war years and the death of Khomeini, was another factor that contributed to the reformist 
elite’s election victory. Division among the elite signaled the possibility of change to 
opposition groups. As explained previously about the revolution’s outcomes and 
economic mismanagement, the conservative elite had long depleted their good will with 
the people by abusing their power and ignoring the real demands of Iranians. In addition, 
the new supreme leader, Khamenei, was not qualified to be a true leader and was 
incapable of justifying the divine rule of the jurist, although his power was extended by 
the 1989 constitutional amendments. Ayatollah Montazeri was Khomeini’s designated 
successor by his religious credentials and long association with the regime, but the 
Supreme Leader himself had pushed him aside because of Montazeri’s criticisms of the 
regime’s brutal violence and injustice in the late 1980s.113 When the Assembly of Experts 
elected Sayyed Ali Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader of the IRI on June 4, 1989, he 
had not been at the rank of “marja’iyyat (being a source of imitation) as required by the 
Articles of 107 and 109 of the 1979 Constitution,”114 nor had the constitution been 
amended. The Iranian constitution was amended soon after, by order of Khomeini, and 
approved by the new Supreme Leader after a national referendum on July 8, 1989. The 
1989 amendments eliminated the qualification of marja’iyyat for being a jurist; these 
amendments, however, also expanded the powers of the leader, such as giving him the 
appointment of the head of radio and television, determination of general policies, and 
coordination of relations among three branches of the government—the Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial branches. In addition, the office of prime minister was abolished, 
giving the president complete executive power. The Supreme Judiciary Council was 
replaced by the Head of Judiciary, who was to be appointed by the Supreme Leader. All 
112 Farhad Kazemi, “The Precarious Revolution,” 91. 
113 Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, 36. 
114 Ibid., 36. 
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 the amendments were meant to undermine the popular legitimacy of the system and give 
absolute power to the jurists. The new Supreme Leader used his office’s capabilities fully 
to retain his control over the Revolutionary Guards, government bureaucracy, military, 
security forces, religious and mobilizational organizations, foundations, and Friday 
prayer leaders.  
While the traditional conservative clergy was expanding its power, the pragmatist 
conservative clergy under the leadership of President Rafsanjani was strengthening the 
possible opposition groups among the ruling clergy and society against the personally 
weak leader, by means of economic liberation efforts. For example, he gave more 
emphasis to management than ideology that would create effective local governance 
capable of mobilizing resources, delivering social services, and bringing change. The 
mayor of Tehran, Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi, was the best example of this policy. 
Moreover, many specialists, managers, and academics of the Shah’s period who had lost 
their jobs were encouraged to come back. New research institutions were founded and 
government training centers renovated. The government strengthened higher education to 
produce skilled personnel for the necessary developments. While the government was 
investing in institutions of higher education, it encouraged the private sector to invest as 
well. Daneshgah-e Azad-e Eslami (Islamic Open University) was founded and built many 
campuses in various cities of Iran. The newly educated personnel joined the government 
echelons and created a new middle class. The privatization or more accurately the hand-
over of the public sector to the ruling elite’s cronies, created parallel and competing 
power centers among the factional fault lines in addition to formal government 
institutions. While rising inflation was leading government officials to take bribes and 
President Rafsanjani was referring to these bribes as “expeditionary fees,”115 corruption 
generated complex ties between political, bureaucratic, and business groups.    
3. Dual Legitimacy 
President Khatami tried to use his strong public support and election victory to 
change the Islamic regime to more liberal ways, and challenged the divine legitimacy, 
115 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran, 124. 
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 implicitly, for the first time in Iran, even though the system was under the strict control of 
the new Supreme Leader. After the elections, the Khatami period relatively relaxed the 
state repression and carried the political discussions to the public. His “rainbow 
coalition”116 of modernists, technocrats, Islamist liberals, and Islamist leftist-populists 
who emerged in the domestic politics of Iran during the Rafsanjani years proposed a 
large-scale political and economic reform agenda as well as the empowerment of citizens. 
Khatami’s foremost objective was to ensure the Iranians’ most fundamental right to 
determine their own destiny. He declared that to obtain this objective, the policies of the 
Executive branch would be based on “institutionalizing the rule of law; vigorous pursuit 
of justice…; promoting and consolidating the principle of accountability…; empowering 
the people in order to achieve and ensure an ever-increasing level of their discerning 
participation.”117 Although he could not immediately implement his agenda to produce 
new legislation, his election opened the reexamination of fundamental principles of the 
regime and broke the taboo of questioning the Supreme Leader’s role in Iranian politics. 
Khatami appointed a Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution by taking 
responsibility for the existing authority of the president in Article 113 of the constitution. 
He also promoted freedom of the press and allowed even some publications that had not 
been permitted by former administrations. The number of publications, ranging from 
daily newspapers to journals, increased and reached more than 1,200.118 Since radio and 
television were under the control of the conservative factions and unelected branches of 
the government, the rising number of news outlets and their ability to publish more 
critical articles brought political discussions in front of the Iranians. President Khatami 
focused on empowering Iranian citizens and promoted the rule of law with his reformist 
policies; his attempts, however, were undermined by the unelected bodies of the 
government. 
116 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives, 5. 
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 4. Threats 
After the elections, the Khatami period relatively relaxed state repression and 
carried the political discussion to the public; the IRI’s unelected institutions, however, 
curtailed reform efforts and freedom of the press. The conservative clergy was aware that 
the new Supreme Leader was not capable of challenging the reformist president’s huge 
popular support, even with his office’s powers. The conservatives had to marshal all 
available forces to contain the president in decision making and legislature.119 The 
Guardian Council and judiciary played the leading part in this confrontation. The 
Guardian Council was the most important asset of the conservatives. It would veto the 
reformists’ legislation that could have diminished the powers of unelected institutions. 
President Khatami’s administration, in fact, did try to do so, especially after the 1999 
parliamentary elections that gave a majority of the seats to reformists. However, the 
Guardian Council vetoed the legislation that reformists passed in the Majles on “women’s 
rights, family law, the prevention of torture, and electoral reform.”120 Since the Guardian 
Council had the approbatory supervision of election candidates,121 President Khatami 
also tried to deprive the jurists of this council their other means to block reformists in 
April 1999. However, the Majles reaffirmed this power after the students’ uprising, with 
pressure from conservatives in the parliament. The judiciary was the second asset for 
conservatives to curtail the reform efforts. Although President Khatami had expected the 
assistance of the Iranian judiciary “in the management of a safe, secure, and just society 
based on rule of law,”122 this second unelected body of the system was also under the 
control of conservatives. The judiciary targeted the freedom of the press. While the pro-
Khatami press was flourishing after the relaxation of state repression, the Supreme 
Leader called reformist journalism a grave threat. The Iranian judiciary banned 108 
newspapers and magazines between 1997 and 2002.123 
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 While state repression increased after the short period of its relaxation, state 
violence directly mobilized huge numbers of students to protest the regime when one of 
the daily magazines, Salaam, was closed by the government in July 1999. The possibility 
of a more dangerous situation of political dissidence had caused a severe response from 
conservative authority. The government started to attack the reformist camp’s assets and 
supporters. In addition to legal closures and the arrest of journalists and editors of these 
publications, the conservatives took illegal actions to secure their power, including the 
assassination of several liberals and reformist journalists by a “renegade group within the 
Ministry of Intelligence.”124 Khatami insisted on the arrest of this group, which included 
a deputy minister, Sa’id Emami. He was imprisoned and said to have committed suicide. 
Shortly after this news, the reformist magazine Salaam published a secret letter written 
by him that summarized “the restrictive law with provisions of clerical censorship”125 
that caused the magazine’s closure. Students in the University of Tehran started riots in 
response to the closure on the evening of July 7 and continued the next day, but the 
Revolutionary Guards, regular police, and hooligans of the Helpers of God (Ansar 
Allah)126 violently tried to suppress the initial movement. The students were beaten, shot, 
and arrested, causing an officially unreleased number of casualties more than 200 injured 
and some 500 arrests. In response to this violence, the protests spread to Tabriz and 
fourteen other Iranian cities.  
C. STUDENTS AS THE MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND THEIR 
RESOURCES 
In general, the mobilizing structures and resources increased with the reform 
efforts of Khatami. He appointed reform-minded intellectuals to his administration, such 
as his Islamic Culture and Guidance Minister, Ataollah Mohajerani and even a woman, 
Ma’someh Ebtekar, as his vice-president and instructed them to actively promote the 
establishment of civic organizations.  The numbers of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), quasi-political parties and associations increased as much as the number of 
124 Nasser Momayesi, “Iran’s Struggle for Democracy,” 55. 
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 newspapers and journals, especially in the areas of environmental issues, women’s rights, 
youth issues and education. “Khatami himself established two NGOs and financed a 
dozen more NGOs specializing in women’s issues. Among the new NGOs, there were 
3,000 youth NGOs, 600 environmental NGOs, 500 women’s NGOs, 60 NGOs engaged 
in human rights issues, and many other NGOs working for children and other vulnerable 
groups”127 during his presidency. At the end of his first term, there were also 95 new 
quasi-political parties, 110 employers’ guilds and 120 workers’ guilds. The rise of civic 
organizations was preparing a more active force for new social movements in Iran. 
However, they were too immature to unify for a collective challenge to the regime until 
the recent Green Movement in 2009.  
Since other civic organizations were not ready, the students were the first to 
challenge the regime. They were mobilized in the universities, where they could freely 
discuss the problems of the state and society, just as they had mobilized two decades ago 
for the conservative clergy. The students had always been the most effective recruits of 
social movements—especially when they allied with elites in Iran. The Iranian students’ 
mobilization capacity and efficacy was one of the highest in the word. The seizure of the 
U.S. Embassy on November 4, 1979, and the holding of American diplomats as hostages 
for 444 days by “a group of Muslim students calling themselves Daaneshjooyaane 
Mosalmaane Payro Khat-e Emaam (the Muslim Students Following the Imam's Path, 
hereafter MSFIL)”128 under the leadership of Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat  (Office for 
Consolidation of Unity‒O.C.U. or Union of Islamic Association of University 
Students),129 justified the strength of Iranian student activism with the boldest, most 
radical, and most consequential action by any student group in the history of student 
activism. The Iranian revolution had started with seminary students who had even 
participated in high-risk situations against the violent tyranny of the Shah.130 The secular 
students from Iranian universities joined the struggle and supported the Islamic 
127 Omid Payrow Shabani, “The Green’s Non-Violent Ethos: The Roots of Non-Violence in the 
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 revolutionaries; their demands and expectations, however, were different from those of 
the clergy and its grassroots supporters. The secular-minded scholars and professors in 
the Shah’s universities were a threat to the Islamic regime. Although students and 
universities had played a critical role in the achievement of the Islamic Revolution, the 
clergy destroyed the secular students’ oppositional activism within the Cultural 
Revolution and created new student organizations that would support the revolution. 
Although the students protested, the universities were closed, and a new curriculum was 
developed according to Islamic principles.131  
The revolutionaries created the student organizations to support their ideology and 
produce a new generation to serve them, but their initial supporters turned into their 
rivals. During the Cultural Revolution and after the reopening of universities, the sole 
body of student organizations left in the Iranian universities was the O.C.U., the Islamic 
Students’ Association, which took part in the destruction of other student organizations. 
The members of O.C.U. became the representative of the state in campuses. They made 
the new regime’s propaganda, controlled political activism, and met ideological 
challenges. During the Iran-Iraq war, this organization mobilized hundreds of students to 
the front lines. There was no political activism or student organization on the campuses 
other than O.C.U. before the end of the war.132 During the post-war years, student 
activism was limited to organizing speeches and seminars on cultural, religious, 
philosophical, and political subjects. These activities started to turn more critical of the 
conservatives’ affairs. In response to the students’ critical tone, the conservative clergy 
created “parallel organizations”133 in universities in 1992, to contain the growing 
dissidence of O.C.U. in 1992. These organizations were the Islamic Association of 
Students (I.A.S.), the Students’ of Islamic Society, the Hezbollah Students Union and 
Student Basij. Although both the Supreme Leader Khamenei and the President Rafsanjani 
supported these groups, the I.A.S. challenged the economic policies of the president, and 
things started to change. The O.C.U. and I.A.S. would be the most active groups who 
131 Ali Akbar Mahdi, “The Student Movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 3-3. 
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 would support the reformist presidential candidate, Ayatollah Khatami, in his campaign 
later.  
The students’ world views and political stance changed in response to state-
attributed economic and political problems as much as they were educated and learned 
from the new intellectuals’ ideas. The students were the most effected part of the society 
by the long-lasting economic problems of Iran. Their changing world views made them 
realize the necessity of a more open society and personal freedoms. While they were 
educated and informed with the ideas of new intellectuals, they began to see the 
illegitimacy of divine rule. The Iranian university educational environment and student 
organization connections helped them to mobilize.  
As noted earlier, student activism had started long before the 1997 presidential 
elections, but the students’ contributions to the presidential election and victory of the 
reformists were novel and determinative. The students in support of the reformers were 
among the voters, activists, and reference groups. First, there were nearly 1.2 million 
students in Iranian universities, most of who participated in the elections and voted for 
Khatami, according to many analysts. Their vote count was more than 1 million out of a 
total 20 million votes for Khatami. Second, the estimated number of officially involved 
students in Khatami’s presidential campaign was 5,000. The students’ informal 
contribution had to be much greater since the O.C.U. had branches in sixty state 
universities and several Islamic Azad universities. Last, the students were the reference 
groups for ordinary Iranians with their growing social and political status in Iran, where 
no oppositional political party or reliable official media existed.134 
The students’ activism, organizations, and resources expanded after the elections 
with the relaxation of state repression and the promotion of political activism by the 
Khatami administration that would enable them to start protesting. The first independent 
student organizations were founded in this period, long before the 1999 student protests 
in Tehran, with many peaceful demonstrations taking place on and off campus on 
historical occasions like Student Day. The new independent student organizations were 
134 Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 293. 
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 Iran’s Intellectual Students’ Organization, The Student Committee to Defend Political 
Prisoners, Students’ and the Alumni National Union.135 They were small but liberal and 
nationalist, as well as allied with other student organizations, both from state and private 
universities. They started to build connections with emerging semi-political parties and 
other civic organizations noted earlier. Moreover, the students’ publications increased 
along with the numbers of organizations. There were 260 student journals in the 1998 
“Student Press Festival,”136 and this number increased.  
The student protests in July 1999 marked the “beginning of the end” or “Iran’s 
second revolution”137 for many analysts. Huge numbers of students in Iranian streets and 
growing numbers of student organizations on campuses carried out the rising political 
activism. The reformist elite could use the movement as leverage to undermine the 
legitimacy of divine rule if they had wanted. However, both the reformist elite’s 
unwillingness to do so and the belligerent behavior of some of the student groups that 
clashed with security forces prevented that. Moreover, what was missing in terms of 
social movements in the students’ uprising was that the students lacked a unified 
leadership that would keep demonstrations peaceful and maintain consistent demands.138 
The students could not reach the other growing dissident groups of Iranian society such 
as women and the middle class or workers who would have enhanced the frames of the 
movement and turned it into a broader pro-democracy uprising. Nevertheless, the student 
organizations and their increasing resources proved the students’ potential.    
D. FRAMING 
Growing ideas of personal liberties and freedom within the ideological framework 
of Shi’a Islam framed the student movements. First, the new intellectuals’ ideas framed 
their activism, as they appealed to and influenced the world views of students after the 
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 period of the Islamization project. While the Islamic government forced Iranians to live 
according to Shi’a Islam’s daily practices and censored other global values in the world, 
international developments on global values reached the Iranian students with the help of 
world media and communication technologies. The students’ support of the reformist 
elite and protests against the closure of opposition press was the reaction to state 
repression on personal freedoms, which was compatible with Islam.  
Although the students’ activism in Iran had been framed by the ideology of the 
IRI after the revolution, the revolution’s “Islamic utopianism”139 failed with remarkable 
events such as the unexpected defeat in the war, the removal of Ayatollah Montazeri 
from his position, the privatization of the economy by Rafsanjani, and exorbitant 
financial affairs of the ruling clergy and the spread of corruption. While the students were 
alienated from the IRI’s ideology, the new religious intellectuals’ ideas started to resonate 
in the minds of students. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Abdolkarim Soroush and 
Mosen Kadivar were the most notable ones, as was reformist President Khatami.140 These 
intellectuals generally argued that Islam plays a critical role in human life and is as 
compatible with democracy as it is in Western countries. The new intellectuals argued the 
importance of popular legitimacy and the rule of law in Islamic terms, as opposed to the 
conservatives who saw the importance of divine legitimacy with Islamic values as 
paramount. Although these ideas had existed before, the difference this time was that 
these new religious intellectuals were disseminating their message through growing 
numbers of pro-reformist press and reaching the students in universities in person. For 
example, Soroush and Shabestari published their series of articles in the journal Kayhan-e 
Farhangi in the early 1990s.141 President Khatami made several speeches on campuses 
during his presidential campaign.  
Simultaneously with these new intellectuals’ ideas, the global values such as 
human rights, women’s rights and equality in the world were rising and reaching students 
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 via radio, satellite TV, and the Internet. The radio programs on the BBC, Voice of 
America, Radio France, Radio Israel, and Radio Free Europe had political content. The 
democratic values were penetrating into Iranian society, especially among the youth and 
students since they were less antagonistic to the West than their parents. Satellite TV and 
Internet facilitated and increased this penetration as they quickly spread to Iran. For 
example, there were at least 30,000 satellite dishes in 1994. There were 65,000 to 80,000 
people who had Internet accounts in 1999. In addition, the young Iranians were accessing 
the Internet not only from private accounts but also from Internet cafes that numbered 
nearly 1,500 in Tehran alone.142 When the conservatives crashed the students’ uprising in 
1999, the students had already been learning and seeking their basic rights, both in 
Islamic and global terms.  
E. OUTCOMES  
The students’ movement alliance with the reformist elite ended when President 
Khatami could not back up the students’ protests against state violence.  The outcome 
was disastrous for the reformist elite and many students, but neither the reformist elite 
nor the students quit their political struggle for a more liberal government and society. 
The students continued their political activism in their lives and limited space. Although 
their unity and their movement’s efficacy waned, the Iranian students brought an 
irreversible challenge to the IRI’s legitimacy when they were severely suppressed by the 
Iranian security forces. The students became one of the reference points for ordinary 
Iranians to ask for whom to vote and why. The Student Movement initiated the early 
changes of Iranian public opinion about the Islamic regime and political disclosures in 
the IRI. The majority of Iranians did not take part in the student movements but they once 
more showed their dissatisfaction with the conservative clergy by electing a lay person, 
Ahmadinejad, as the president who succeeded Khatami, for more accountable governance 
that would bring equality and better economic conditions, if not a more liberal society.  
142 Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 304. 
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 IV. THE GREEN MOVEMENT IN IRAN 
The Green Movement was the last episode of Iranian social movements that 
started in response to the 2009 presidential election results and turned into a pro-
democracy movement. It testified to the existence of a continuous and growing social 
collective force in Iran that pushes liberalization from below against the IRI’s rigidity and 
severe state repression. Although many thought it was unsuccessful and had waned, the 
Green Movement was actually a victory in two ways. First, the movement was successful 
in terms of social movements that united the separate mobilizational groups with broader 
frames and peaceful tactics. Second, it arguably shook the IRI’s legitimacy after the 
Supreme Leader Khamenei’s partial response to alleged election fraud, which backed 
President Ahmadinejad and the Iranian government’s severe repression of peaceful 
protesters. In addition, the movement’s silent continuity and efforts changed Iranian 
opinion, which eventually was testified with the election of a reformist candidate in the 
first round of the 2013 presidential elections.  
The Green Movement started as a reactionary social movement when Iranians 
tried once more to change their regime. The Iranian state’s continuous and occasional 
opportunities, along with threats, served in different ways for a larger opposition, this 
time. The Iranian conservatives had not seemed united after the Khatami era, but the 
policies of President Ahmadinejad, which were neither keeping this faction’s interests 
intact nor solving Iranians’ economic problems, signaled a possible weakness to 
opposition groups. The 2009 presidential election and relative relaxation of state 
restrictions on the media during the election period provided the Iranian state’s 
occasional political opening to take action as it had done in 1997. The reformist elite 
utilized this opportunity to gain access to the executive part of the government once 
again, but the conservatives allegedly rigged the election and unleashed state security 
forces on protesters, which caused the sudden erosion of rights and severe repression. 
Unlike in the 1999 Student Movement, the conservatives’ response was more brutal and 
direct, which undermined the legitimacy of the divine rulers since the elections had been 
a strong justification of the regime so far. The long-lasting economic problems attributed 
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 to the government, continuous erosion of rights and severe state repression enlarged this 
occasional opportunity and mobilized Iranians to secure their rights. Although Iranian 
NGOs were scarce and formal organizations’ activities were limited and controlled by the 
Iranian government, the student, women, and other civic organizations that had been 
founded in the Khatami era and their underground links mobilized different groups to 
protest. Iranian reformists, students, and women were the main participants of the Green 
Movement. Information and communication technologies, with social media like 
Facebook and Twitter, helped these groups to create a free space for political discourse, 
distribute information about state violence and recruit members to protest. The Green 
Movement utilized the same frames and many tactics of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. 
Shi’a Islam’s revolutionary frames were regenerated by opposition groups and utilized to 
challenge the conservative clergy, in a sort of cultural jiu-jitsu.143  
The state’s severe repression of protesters and the movement’s own leadership 
thwarted it; the Green Movement, however, did not end. It kept working peacefully to 
emerge again since both its leaders and participants did not want to radicalize which 
would cause the same grievous consequences as in 1979, during the war, and in 1999. 
The Green Movement created a new identity that posed the greatest threat to divine 
legitimacy in the IRI’s short history and which would be hard to fix for conservative 
clergy in the future. The alleged election fraud and reaction of peaceful masses changed 
the Iranians’ opinion about the Islamic regime.  
A. THE GROWING DEMANDS OF IRANIANS AND THE GREEN 
MOVEMENT  
Unlike the Student Movement in 1999, the Green Movement had broader 
demands directly addressing the Supreme Leader, since the movement was a coalition of 
different groups who sought change. The movement’s manifesto targeting the Supreme 
Leader announced ten goals on January 3, 2010, including:  
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 1. Resignation of Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad [as the president]…abolish 
the vetting process of candidates [by the Guardian Council]…, 2. 
Releasing all the political prisoners…, 3. Free means of mass 
communication…, 4. Recognizing the rights of all the lawful political 
groups, university students and women movements…, 5. Independence of 
the universities [from political meddling and intervention]; …abolishing 
the illegal Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution [that interferes in the 
affairs of the universities]…, 6. Putting on trial all those that have tortured 
and murdered [people]…, 7. Independence of the judiciary by electing 
[rather than appointing] its head …, 8. Banning the military, police, and 
security forces from intervening in politics…, 9. Economic and political 
independence of the seminaries…, 10. Electing all the officials who must 
become responsive to criticisms… Not meeting these [legitimate] 
demands of the Green Movement … will also deepen the crisis with 
painful consequences, for which only the Supreme Leader will be 
responsible.144 
Almost six months before this manifesto, the Green Movement was born after the 
Iranian presidential elections in 2009, as a reactionary protest using peaceful tactics. It 
took its name from a green sash that Iran’s previous two-term president Mohammad 
Khatami handed to Mir Hossein Mousavi. The initial slogan in the protest was “Where is 
my vote?”145 The oppositional groups demanded their stolen votes and annulment of the 
election, but the Supreme Leader and incumbent government responded to the claimants 
with severe state repression. The demands expanded in time, and the Green Movement 
turned into a pro-democracy movement in Iran. However, the IRI’s rulers accused 
opposition leaders of being traitors working for Western powers and defined the Green 
Movement as a “velvet revolution.”146 The leaders of the movement were arrested, and 
two presidential candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, were put under 
house arrest in 2011. The events between 2009 and 2011 were carved into the memories 
of Iranians as one thing: the IRI needed reform.  
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 B. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE GREEN MOVEMENT 
The Green Movement happened when the Iranian state’s continuous and 
occasional opportunities (along with threats) served in different ways for a larger group 
of opposition. The majority of Iranians had not taken part in the Student Movement, but 
they had shown dissatisfaction with conservative clergy by electing a lay person, 
Ahmadinejad, as the president who succeeded Khatami. However, the first term of the 
new president signaled the inadequacy of the choice. The division among the ruling elite 
deepened and intra-conservative confrontation started. Economic problems continued but 
were not solved as proposed by President Ahmadinejad. The presidential election was an 
opportunity to take advantage of the situation for the reformist elite, as it was in 1997. 
The reformists, however, lost in the elections. The alleged election fraud suddenly 
showed the erosion of rights to Iranians, and the Supreme Leader’s partiality undermined 
the divine legitimacy of the IRI.  
1. Division of Elite and Intra-Conservative Conflict 
Before the 2009 elections, although the conservative camp seemed united, there 
was a power struggle between traditional and new conservatives that created an 
opportune division in the elite for opposition groups, especially the reformist elite. The 
presidency of Ahmadinejad, who was a student activist in the revolution, a senior 
commander of the Sepah Army or Basij in the Iran-Iraq war, and a middle-rank political 
figure as the mayor of Tehran, transformed the political struggle in Iran from 
conservative versus reformist to intra-conservative.147 The conservatives, in fact, had 
created their own paradox when they tried to contend with liberal reform efforts during 
President Khatami’s two-term presidency by empowering the security and economic 
apparatus of the IRI while the Guardian Council and judiciary were attacking the 
reformers’ assets.148  A new faction of conservatives was born: neo-conservatives or neo-
147 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives, 54. 
148 Vali Nasr, “The Conservative Wave Rolls On,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 4 (October 2005), 
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 principalists,149 whose members were rising from the echelons of the IRGC and Basij. 
While the IRGC had been a security and economic asset of conservatives in the early 
post-revolution and during the war years under Khomeini, the new Supreme Leader, 
Khamenei, turned it into more of a political player by appointing the most loyal 
conservatives to the higher ranks of the IRGC and using them to suppress reformists. 
During President Khatami’s years, many of these figures entered Iranian domestic 
politics through regional or parliamentary elections. For example, President Ahmadinejad 
himself was the most remarkable figure of this new faction, who won the City and 
Village Council elections in 2003.150 The neo-conservatives also won one-third of all 
seats in legislative elections in 2004.151   
With its rising power in Iran, the neo-conservative faction challenged the 
traditional conservatives and the absolute rule of clergy on Shi’a jurisprudence, as well as 
the role of clergy in the state and the economy. Initially, this new faction’s political 
ideology followed “the jurisprudence of Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi,”152 
which had a strong anti-clerical, authoritarian, national, and pragmatic stance. Different 
from the concept of wilayat al-faqih 153 that justified the rule of the jurist and, by its 
extension, clergy, by both divine and popular legitimacy, Yazdi proposed that Faqih 
could only derive his legitimacy from God, not people. In addition, this legitimacy could 
be actualized by anyone who has power. The neo-conservatives denied the right of 
clerical rule under this ideology, since they were the soldiers of the revolution and the 
war, paying high prices with their lives. This denial took many forms. For example, 
President Ahmadinejad’s claim that the last Imam visited him in his dreams and public 
appearances was an attempt to separate clergy and the basis of its legitimacy. More 
concretely, Ahmadinejad filled the government, especially his cabinet, with members of 
the IRGC and related organizations compared to previous officials who had links to the 
149 Roozbeh Safshekan and Farzan Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis,” The Middle East Journal 64, no. 4 (Autumn 2010), 550.  
150 Roozbeh Safshekan and Farzan Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians,” 549. 
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 clergy. Last, the neo-conservatives’ ideology also turned the IRI’s Islamic rhetoric to a 
more nationalistic tone, which sought to make a great Iran by promoting a strong army 
and economy rather than a revolutionary enterprise and Islamic economics. Thus, the 
neo-conservatives tried to develop an economy like the Chinese model, which enhanced 
the state over the economy, with privatization of large state sectors to the affiliated 
organizations or individuals with a populist intent, to gain Iranians’ support by producing 
required jobs and better economic conditions for the poor. This policy, however, favored 
neo-conservatives’ cronies most. For example, “the Khatim al-Anbiya’ Headquarters, the 
IRGC’s most visible economic arm,”154 became the biggest contractor of the government 
by bypassing the bidding process completely.  
2. Alleged Election Fraud as a Motivator 
While the conservative elite was contending with the rise of neo-conservatives 
and intra-conservative struggle was continuing, the 2009 presidential election and relative 
relaxation of state restrictions on media during the election period provided the 
occasional political opportunity for the reformist groups. President Ahmadinejad was the 
frontrunner of the election with his populist redistributive policies, which included direct 
cash handouts. Although the intra-conservative conflict existed, various institutions of the 
regime, like the Guardian Council, were still backing him to some extent.155 On the other 
side, ex-president Mohammad Khatami initially announced his candidacy, but later 
withdrew in favor of Mir Hossein Mousavi, who had been the Prime Minister of the IRI 
between 1981 and 1989.156 At the beginning of his campaign, Mousavi identified himself 
as neither a reformist nor a conservative. The reason for his reemergence in politics was 
primarily because of his disagreement with President Ahmadinejad’s policies. He 
emphasized the need to address the poor economy and “dishonest methods of making 
economic and political decisions.”157  He also argued that President Ahmadinejad had 
been diverted from the revolution’s principles and become a dictator. Mousavi’s 
154 Roozbeh Safshekan and Farzan Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians,” 555. 
155 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “Iran’s Presidential Election,” 14. 
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 presidential campaign mobilized the major reformist groups as much as the others who 
were eager to remove Ahmadinejad. He became a leader for the “anti-Ahmadinejad 
coalition,”158 since he was religious and ethnically Azeri-Turk, and his wife supported the 
women’s rights struggle. The core supporters of Mousavi were the educated urban middle 
class, women, youth, and even those who voted for Ahmadinejad in the previous election. 
The IRI relaxed the media restrictions for election competition and encouraged public 
debates for election campaigns. The candidates even debated on TV, which generally 
happens in democracies like the United States of America. Mousavi’s popularity 
increased with his liberal points of view. His wife’s former activities and support for 
Iranian women’s rights in the presidential campaign helped him. His criticisms about 
Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement and injustice attracted many in Iran, but the 
Guardian Council banned his campaign and public gatherings after the TV debates. The 
reformist opposition started to use social media to continue its struggle and ask for the 
votes of Iranians. 
3. Casting a Shadow on Dual Legitimacy 
The alleged election fraud and direct support of the Supreme Leader to President 
Ahmadinejad worked hand-in-hand to undermine both the popular and divine legitimacy 
of the Iranian political system. The rise of Mousavi and his election campaign raised a 
challenging constituency, but the Green Movement had begun and the legitimacy of the 
IRI started to crumble when the election was allegedly rigged, and ended with 
Ahmadinejad’s landslide victory. The result of the election was announced by the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) on Saturday, June 13. President Ahmadinejad was the winner, 
having received about 24,600,000 of approximately 39,400,000 valid votes or 62.63 
percent.159 Mousavi had only around 13,300,000 votes, and the other candidates had 
fewer than 1,000,000 votes. The result was problematic because the reported number of 
eligible voters was less than in the previous elections in 2008, which was impossible with 
158 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “Iran’s Presidential Election,” 15. 
159 M. Hadi Sohrabi-Haghighat and Shohre Mansouri, “Where is My Vote? ICT Politics in the 
Aftermath of Iran’s Presidential Election,” International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society, 8, 
no. 1 (2010), 28. 
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 the population growth rate of Iran. Second, the MOI never announced the vote 
distribution of provinces and districts. Third, the SMS network was turned off, observers 
of Mousavi’s campaign were expelled from polling stations, and insufficient precautions 
were taken to prevent vote selling and ballot stuffing. In addition, the IRI government 
never took any real action to investigate the election fraud by an independent 
commission. All of these factors undermined both the credibility of the elections and 
public trust of the electoral system.160  
In addition to the problematic presidential election that created question marks on 
the tenets of the popular legitimacy of the system, the Supreme Leader made his biggest 
mistake by supporting President Ahmadinejad after the elections and warning that 
violence would be used to stop protests. He had not made such a mistake during the 1999 
Student Movement, one that would directly confront him and his office with Iranians on 
the streets. First, the Supreme Leader immediately confirmed the presidency of 
Ahmadinejad although the losing parties were requesting an investigation of the election 
fraud. He soon after accepted this request; his prompt announcement, however, increased 
the peoples’ doubts. Later, after the protests began, he warned the opposition in his 
Friday sermon on June 19 to stop the demonstrations or its leaders would be responsible 
for “chaos, violence, and bloodshed.”161 His two actions put him firmly on the same side 
as the liars and despots who rigged the election, and finished his arbiter role in the 
regime.162  
4. Threats as a Motivator 
Although the IRI’s continuous and occasional political opportunities were helpful, 
the main motives of protesters in the Green Movement were the result of economic 
problems, as well as state repression and the sudden erosion of civic rights after the 
elections. President Ahmadinejad’s populist policies and pragmatic efforts could not 
solve the chronic economic problems that mobilized many Iranians first to support 
160 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “Iran’s Presidential Election,” 15. 
161 Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, 170. 
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 Mousavi and later the Green Movement. However, it was state repression and theft of 
Iranians’ votes that changed economic grievances to political demands and brought huge 
numbers of people to the streets.  
Ahmadinejad’s previous victory in 2005 was due to his economic promises for 
poor Iranians; the economic conditions in Iran, however, had not changed much before 
the 2009 elections. President Ahmadinejad turned to more populist economic policies 
with his promises to Iranians such as, “bringing the oil money to people’s tables”163 in 
2005. The government provided more public subsidies for gasoline, food, and housing. 
Energy subsidies alone represented about 12% of Iran’s GDP if not more in real 
measures. In addition to subsidies, President Ahmadinejad gave cash handouts to the 
poor. The government provided low-interest loans for agriculture, tourism and industry, 
and instituted loan forgiveness policies. Ahmadinejad’s administration established the 
$1.3 billion Imam Reza Mehr Fund (Imam Reza Compassion Fund) to assist youth with 
marriage, housing, and education in 2006.  In 2007, the government implemented a 
rationing system to reduce gasoline consumption. Although this policy led to public riots, 
gasoline consumption dropped. In January 2010, after the Supreme Leader’s support of 
President Ahmadinejad’s targeted subsidy reform, the parliament passed a massive 
overhaul of Iran’s system of state subsidies. The subsidy law reduced state subsidies by 
$20 billion and sent some part of them directly to the pockets of many poor via bank 
accounts. The goals of the reforms were to reduce overconsumption, poverty, and 
inequality.  Many thought the reduction of Iran’s subsidies were necessary for Iran’s 
long-term economic sustainability, but subsidy cuts led to high inflation in the prices of 
basic goods and gasoline. President Ahmadinejad’s efforts turned into more budget 
deficits, and his subsidies remained ineffective in reducing inflation, unemployment, and 
poverty;164 they also damaged market prices with government price-control policies.  
While the economic problems were intensifying, the allegedly rigged election and 
state repression of protesters caused occasional threats. Iranians’ economic grievances 
163 Shayerah Ilias, Iran’s Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, 
April 22, 2010. 
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 turned into political demands after the election results. The protests started immediately 
after the announcement of election results. Although he cancelled at the last minute, 
Mousavi was the one who called for the first protests on June 15.165 The Iranians did not 
respond to the cancellation but spontaneously started to march peacefully as their number 
rose to millions. The IRI government, with the blessings of the Supreme Leader, used its 
Basij (volunteer militias under the IRGC) and security forces against the demonstrators. 
This use of force caused large numbers of casualties; protests, however, continued almost 
for a month longer with unprecedented numbers. Later, the scale of the demonstrations 
was reduced, but they did not end although the security forces used every means to 
suppress the masses. They accused protesters of being traitors working for Western 
powers. The government hanged several people and showed their willingness to continue 
publicly hanging more protesters. The protest leaders and their supporters were arrested, 
tortured, and exiled. The media was banned. The government ignored what happened at 
the end of the elections. However, the Green Movement continued to carry on 
demonstrations almost in every possible gathering, such as the anniversary of the Student 
Movement or religious days that the government had not banned. 
C. MOBILIZATION STRUCTURES AND RESOURCES OF THE GREEN 
MOVEMENT  
Although the Green Movement in Iran did not have an intact hierarchical structure 
and did not include the huge membership of formal organizations like workers or 
teachers unions, the reformist faction of the ruling Shi’a clergy, many intellectuals from 
universities, journalists, and a growing number of educated, urban, middle class took part 
in the Green Movement. Three main social classes in Iran—reformists, students, and 
women—in this growing middle class were the most active members of the Movement 
since their organizational capabilities and links were increasing with the help of the 
Khatami era. While reformists proposed better governance and took support from the 
mainly urban middle class in the election, Iranian students and women became the front 
runners of the movement with their informal and underground links to Iranian society. 
165 Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, 169. 
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 Because the IRI’s government had severely suppressed any formal opposition 
organizations, and forced formal organizations to abide by the regime’s rules, it was not a 
surprise not to see workers and other organizations in the movement as a whole. 
However, small numbers of workers, teachers, and even government officials 
individually took part in the Green Movement.166 Although there is scarce data about the 
Green Movement’s mobilizing resources, the information and communication 
technologies were the biggest resources of the movement that enabled the opposition to 
bypass government censorship and inform Iranians.  
1. The Reformist Elite and Its Role 
The reformist faction of the Shi’a clergy and its links to Iran’s urban middle class 
were the leadership cadre of the Green Movement.  Their roots and reform efforts dated 
back to the 1905‒1911 Constitutional Revolution, which demanded democratic 
government, elections, and a parliamentary system. Mehdi Bazargan, Ali Shariati, 
Ayatollah Morteza Mottahari and Ayatollah Mahmood Telegani were the pioneers of the 
reformists in the 1979 revolution.167 Although Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and 
his supporters repressed reformists in the early years of the revolution, they reemerged 
between 1997 and 2004. Mir Hossein Mousavi, who was put under house arrest because 
of his leadership in the Green Movement, was one of the active participants of the 1979 
revolution;168 the increasing state-attributed economic problems, brutal repression and 
growing erosion of civic rights, however, alienated him and many others like him from 
the government. The reformists never wanted a total regime change, but they demanded 
the true execution of the IRI’s constitution. They saw the affairs of the government as 
corruption and tyranny. They claimed that Islam has a democratic character and that 
Shi’a jurisprudence enables reform by ijtihad (independent reasoning).169 The reformists’ 
modern ideas and moderate behavior appealed generally to intellectuals, journalists, and 
166 Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, “Introduction,” in The People Reloaded: The Green Movement 
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 the educated urban middle class since they were also more interested in liberation than in 
regime change. 
2. Students and Their Role in the Movement 
While reformist Shi’a clergy created the leadership of the movement, Iranian 
students were the foot soldiers of the Green Waves in Iran after the alleged 2009 election 
fraud. Without students, their links, and the universities, there could not be a 
mobilization. The Iranian students had always been politically active, as explained in the 
previous chapter. The reformist era under the presidency of moderate cleric Muhammad 
Khatami provided opportunities and relative free space for the re-creation of student 
organizations in the IRI.170 Although they were suppressed by the current regime, their 
political activism continued. Students increased both in state and private universities. For 
example, there were more than a million students in universities and two million in 
postsecondary schools during the 2005-2006 school year. The female students accounted 
for 64 percent of this population. In addition to these numbers, the students at private 
Azad universities rose from 600,000 in 1997‒1998 to 860,000 in 2004‒2005.171 Students’ 
activism continued to protest the regime, both for their own demands and for greater 
frames. For example, students in Tehran’s Amir Kabir University protested against 
President Ahmadinejad by holding his pictures upside down and chanting “Dictator, go 
home!” when he came to speak in December 2006.172 In addition to their campus 
activism, those who had taken part in the 1999 Student Movement had not quit politics. 
Whether they had become members of the urban middle class, or were the most impacted 
members of the poor and unemployed, they were in the Green Waves, shoulder to 
shoulder.     
170 Ray Takeyh, “Iran at a Crossroads,” The Middle East Journal 57, no. 1 (2003), 42. 
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 3. Women and Their Role as Foot Soldiers 
Women were the other foot soldiers of the Green Movement. Iranian women took 
their part not only in the Green Movement but also in the 1999 Student Movement and in 
the 1979 revolution to end the Shah’s tyranny, but they never gained their deserved 
freedoms. In 1979, Iranian women sided with their husbands and brothers to topple the 
Shah, but they did not anticipate that the post-revolutionary government would lock them 
in their veils and homes. From that time on, women struggled for their civic rights with 
peaceful protests. In 1999, Iranian women took part in the student protests. When the 
students were suppressed, most women concluded that it would be hard to improve the 
situation of women in Iran,173 but continued their protests peacefully. A one-million 
signature campaign was one of the best examples of Iranian women’s efforts for their 
goals. The campaign dimensions demonstrated Iranian women’s capabilities with their 
domestic and international links.174 The Green Movement was just another part of their 
struggle. The pictures of women in the Green Waves testified to their participation in the 
protests. Women helped the movement with their capabilities. 
4. New Resources of the Green Movement  
Long before the Arab Spring, the Green Movement was called a “Twitter 
Revolution.”175 The Green Movement utilized the Internet and the growing number of 
cellphones, with social media like Facebook and Twitter, to distribute information, 
overcome state censorship, and organize protests. In 1992, the Institute for Studies in 
Theoretical Physics and Mathematics initiated Internet usage in Iran.176 The Internet 
remained as an academic tool until 1997, but Internet usage was extended from 
government organizations to the economic sector only. In Iran, there were 25,669,000 
Internet users in 2009, compared to 200,000 in 2001. In addition, there were 50,000,000 
173 Mehrahgiz Kar, “Focusing on Women in the Internal Politics of Iran,” Brown Journal of World 
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 cellphones and 25,220,000 landline phones in 2010.177 Facebook first became a tool for 
elections after the Guardian Council banned presidential candidate Mousavi’s traditional 
communication methods and restricted traditional media. Later, Twitter became a free 
place for political discussions and information sharing. The protesters shared videos and 
pictures of state brutality in these cyber platforms. Although the role of the Internet and 
social media in mobilization is arguably limited compared to face-to-face links, the 
protesters used both Twitter and their cellphones in order to activate their existing 
informal links to organize and initiate their protests. If they were not the main source of 
the mobilization, the Internet and social media carried videos of the IRI’s state brutality 
that aroused the feelings of the Iranian people. 
D. SOURCES OF FRAMING 
Shi’a Islam and its daily practices framed the Green Movement in Iran. The stolen 
votes of many Iranians in the presidential election were the initial reason to protest. 
Iranians realized the injustice of the Islamic government. The Supreme Leader’s partisan 
comments on election results, and threatening voice to stop the Green Movement’s 
protests, intensified oppositional consciousness. Huge numbers of protesters in several 
cities started a cognitive liberation with Iran’s historical background, which had once 
managed to destroy the tyranny of the secular Shah. The government’s violent repression, 
beatings, and killings in the protest only increased this cognitive liberation and motivated 
people to participate rather than stay at home. The protesters began to feel as if they were 
the true defenders of Shi’a Islam and the IRI, since the protesters stayed peaceful and the 
state used more repression. The green color became the symbol of Islam and later turned 
into a symbol of civil rights. People in the protest movement identified themselves as 
defenders of innocents against despots, as if at Karbala.    
The new version of reformist Shi’a Islam, growing ideas of freedom, and 
democracy among Iranian youth, with an Islamist perspective and the holy struggle 
against tyranny in Shi’a history, resonated in both the minds and hearts of the Green 
Wave’s protesters. The reformist version of Shi’a Islam has always advocated human 
177 M. Hadi Sohrabi-Haghighat and Shohre Mansouri, “Where is My Vote?, 25. 
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 rights and democracy. The women’s long struggle for their rights has been changing 
public opinion in Iran about human rights. The globalization of human rights, 
international organizations’ pressure, and easy access to the world via the Internet also 
helped Iranians to see their government’s human rights abuses. Hasan Davoodifard and 
Jayum Jawan argue that the collective efforts of women and international pressure forced 
even the IRI’s incumbent government to launch an “Iranian Islamic Human Rights 
Commission”178 in late 1995. In addition, the growing number of educated youth in Iran 
advocated freedom and democracy. For example, the first systematic analysis of support 
for democracy in the IRI, “Support for Democracy in Iran,” uses data coming from two 
surveys in 2005 and 2008 to argue that, while religiosity and old age negatively relate to 
democracy in the IRI, education, young age, and economic grievances indirectly promote 
democracy in Iran. Greater dissatisfaction with the regime increases the demand for 
democracy in Iran.179  
The participants of the Green Movement mixed the ideas of human rights and 
democracy with Shi’a Islam. The Green Movement arguably shook the regime’s 
legitimacy by attacking its monopoly on Shi’a Islam. It reinterpreted the meaning of 
injustice and equated the incumbent government with that of the secular Shah. The 
protesters applied Shi’a Islam’s values, symbols, stories, and practices to their actions, 
just as the 1979 revolutionary groups did. They placed the Green Movement’s martyrs 
next to the Shi’a Imam, Ali, in their fight against the injustice of the IRI’s government.180 
They showed their wounds proudly to cameras, as if they were signs of their holy 
commitment. Unlike the Student Movement in 1999, the Green Movement stayed 
peaceful by using many tactics from the 1979 revolution. The street marches and street 
barricades, shouting Allah-u-Akbar (God is great) from rooftops at night, and 
encouraging the civil disobedience of women by showing some of their hair were some 
of their tactics. Charles Kruzman argues that the Green Movement was a “cultural jiu-
178 Hassan Davoodifard and Jayum Anak Jawan, “Change of Human Rights Perspective in Iran,” 127. 
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 jitsu”181 that attacked the government monopoly on Shi’a Islam. The government reaction 
and its repression showed the conservatives’ fear of losing their power. 
E. OUTCOMES 
The Green Movement lost its intensity when the IRI government increased its 
level of violent repression, but the movement was not totally dissolved. The government 
ignored what happened at the end of the elections and continued to behave as if 
everything were normal in Iran. However, the movement had changed Iranian public 
opinion about the regime’s legitimacy. The signs of the Green Movement emerged in the 
news again, as the Iranian presidential elections to choose the successor to President 
Ahmadinejad on June 14, 2013, approached. Iranian police arrested supporters of the 
reformist candidate, Hasan Rowhani, on June 2, 2014 after their chants calling for the 
release of Mir Hossein Mousavi, who was still under house arrest after two years.182 
Many Iranians chanted, “Mousavi, Karroubi must be released,” at Grand Ayatollah 
Taheri’s funeral on Tuesday, June 4.183 Although the effects of the Green Movement on 
the 2013 Iranian presidential elections were not clear and necessitate further research, one 
can still conclude that the election of a moderate reformist candidate again in Iran 
testified to the Green Movement’s impact on public opinion. The Green Movement did 
not end, but one thing is sure: social movements in Iran are not going anywhere, no 
matter what the government did and will do to prevent them. 
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 V. CONCLUSION 
Social movements in post-revolutionary Iran have affected and still affect the 
Islamic republic to adopt more liberal ways, even though these movements have not 
managed an institutional change yet. Scholars in the pessimistic camp suggest that the 
rigid unelected institutions of Iran’s complex political system have been the biggest 
obstacle to any positive change or liberalization in Iran. Yet, the changing dynamics of 
Iranian society, with an evolving Shi’a Islamic ideology under state-attributed threats, 
force the Islamic Republic either to find a way to welcome a positive change within the 
system, or doom the Republic to fall apart sooner or later.  
The analysis of two major movements, the Student and Green Movements that 
arose because of the Iranian revolution’s outcomes, proves this argument. Social 
movements in Iran have become a powerful force in domestic politics, with their 
opportunity for ordinary Iranians to participate in politics. Their continuity and growing 
impacts on political competition justify this importance. As a byproduct of the Islamic 
Revolution, the complex Iranian political system provides fundamental and occasional 
opportunities as well as threats. Iranian mobilizing structures and resources have grown 
with the help of IRI’s developmental policies, beginning with the Student Movement in 
domestic politics. Students’ free space in universities and links to society expanded 
because of their organizational and general technological sophistication. The diverse 
participants of the Green Movement including students, former students from 1999 who 
are now in the urban middle class and women demonstrate this expansion. Entrenched 
Shi’a Islam and its daily practices, evolving with global values, in Iran serve as the best 
frame to wrestle against injustice. Social movements in Iran, as elsewhere, create a new 
identity, maintain it, and affect public opinion and the electorate as long as their causes 
continue to exist. Again, the Green Movement expanded its demands and ability to use 
the same frames of revolution against conservative clergy, in order to show the 
improvements and achievements of social movements in Iran as a social force. These 
movements are becoming more of a political actor in an Iranian domestic political 
environment that encourages liberal tendencies.  
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 Under this analysis, the Student Movement, allying with the reformist elite, 
changed Iranian domestic politics irreversibly and also questioned the regime’s divine 
legitimacy for the first time. The movement was unsuccessful in attaining its ultimate 
goals; its long-term effects, however, were significant in Iran. It re-appeared when the 
Green Movement occurred a decade later. Although it was thought that the movement 
was finished and dissolved, it once again managed to provide a chance for Iran to change 
its regime to more liberal ways by influencing public opinion. Although it is too bold to 
suggest that the election of a moderate reformist president in Iran in 2013 was solely the 
effect of the Green Movement, one can still argue that it may not have happened without 
the influence of the Green Movement on Iranian public opinion.   
A. UNFINISHED REVOLUTION OF IRANIANS AND THE MAKING OF 
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  
First and foremost, this thesis takes the 1979 Islamic Revolution as an unfinished 
work of Iranians, in terms of social movements, and argues that the revolution provided 
the structural opportunities by its political system, reproduced and equipped mobilizing 
structures, and promoted Shi’a Islam with its practices as the best frames. The revolution 
was the achievement of Iranians, not the Shi’a Clergy. They had toppled the last Shah, 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, after a long struggle beginning from the time of the 
Constitutional Revolution in the years between 1905 and 1911. The revolution was a 
“multi-class populist movement”184 in which Iranians demanded “political freedom, 
essential rights and political independence and in this way to establish Islam and Islamic 
cultural values in society and create an Islamic government so that there would not be 
poverty and economic deprivation.”185 This revolution resulted from Iranians’ high 
dissatisfaction with the Shah’s monarchic regime. However, the Shi’a clergy stole the 
people’s revolution, under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Rather than a 
fully democratic government, the Islamic Republic of Iran was founded with Khomeini’s 
concept of wilayat al-faqih186 (guardianship of the jurist). 
184 Berch Berberoglu, “The Class Nature of Religion,” 300. 
185 Hamidreza Jalaeipour, “Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” 210.  
186 Ibrahim Moussawi, Shi’ism and the Democratization Process in Iran, 7. 
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 As a result of the foundation of the Islamic Republic and its policies, new social 
movements occurred in Iran. The IRI, as a unique political system of theocracy with 
semi-democratic institutions, provides political opportunities for and threats to social 
movements in Iran. As Paul D. Almeida proposes, there are two avenues for opposition in 
authoritarian settings.187 The classical political opportunity of social movements, division 
among elite, is actualized with the help of the dual legitimacy in the Iranian state 
structure. The Iranian constitution justifies both the divine and the popular legitimacy 
through its articles, as mentioned in Chapter I. The Iranian system of government and its 
incumbent theocratic rulers use elections to testify to their democracy, in which only 
reformist clergy may find a way to gain institutional access. Elections in Iran serve as an 
occasional opportunity, as a limited time of tolerance and relaxed state repression. 
Although these political opportunities have provided motivation for opposition groups to 
challenge the regime, the real factors for social mobilization have come from threats in 
Iran such as chronic economic problems, state repression, and erosion of civil rights, all 
of which drive people into the streets. Generally, economic grievances cannot be the only 
reason for the huge uprisings; these conditions in Iran, however, turn into political 
demands with the help of eventual severe repression and violence by the state. Many 
people deprived by economic hardships, especially the youth and growing urban middle 
class, take part in social movements because of these unresolved problems and the 
tyranny of Iran’s religious rulers.  
The revolution and IRI’s developmental policies after the Iran-Iraq War gave rise 
to five primary opposition forces from different segments of Iranian society: reformist 
elite, intellectuals, youth, students, and women. Reconstruction of the country after the 
war years and efforts to spur economic development improved their organizational and 
communication capabilities. First, the reformist elite separated from the conservative 
clergy and became the natural leader of opposition groups, since they appealed to 
intellectuals, youth, and women. Their political position, in the absence of party politics, 
was that the Shi’a clerics were the “main guiding force for political activity in the 
187 Paul D. Almeida, “Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention,” 106. 
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 country.”188 Second, both religious and secular intellectuals opened up cultural domains 
and pushed modernization and liberation, by their reinterpretation of Shi’a Islam, and 
showing other fields of intellectual life to Iranian society where religion cannot claim 
supremacy.189 With the high population rate of Iran, a new generation of youth emerged 
and continues to grow in Iran. These young Iranians, boys and girls, reject revolutionary 
ideology and are more educated than their elders due to the new regime’s developmental 
policies on education. In the new regime, they suffered and still suffer from the prolonged 
economic problems and repression that is worse than in the Shah’s time. They have 
become more politically active, first in schools with student organizations, and later in 
their lives through their informal links and organizations. Student organizations, which 
were formerly built by the new regime to support the Islamization of education and 
society, have turned into bases of opposition organizations in the free space of 
universities. Art associations, student trade unions, and political student organizations 
have emerged on Iranian campuses. Women’s solidarity networks and non-governmental 
organizations also were founded and have contributed to the social mobilization. The 
Islamic government’s infrastructural developments both changed the face of urban 
centers into more modern places and helped these groups’ communication and 
organizational capabilities by extending electricity, telephone, roads, and other available 
technological means such as TV, Internet, and recent social media applications to even 
remote areas of the country.   
Shi’a Islam, its daily practices, and its historical struggle for justice have become 
the foremost frames of the new social movements in Iran since the revolution itself 
created a revolutionary Islamic identity and integrated religion into governance, and the 
Shi’a clergy tried to Islamize Iranian society. First, although Shi’a Islam did not directly 
advocate rebellion against the rulers, its founding origins that started the Shi’a‒Sunni 
split in Islam justified a meaningful struggle against tyranny and injustice for the 
revolution and created an indigenous identity. Since the Shah attacked Islamic values, 
Islamic practices, and the myth of martyrdom in Shi’a Islam, the martyrdom of Hussein 
188 Reza Razavi, “The Road to Party Politics in Iran: 1979-2009,” 85. 
189 Farhad Khosrokhavar, “The Islamic Revolution in Iran,” 77. 
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 and almost all his close male kin by the Sunni caliph Yazid was a potent theme that 
demonstrated corrupt and oppressive tyranny. This myth was and still is central to 
everyday common sensibilities in Iran.190  
Second, the establishment of an Islamic state structure politicized Shi’a Islam and 
institutionalized the clergy within the government, which had never happened before the 
revolution. The more the government used Shi’a Islamic principles and laws to rule Iran 
and solve Iranians’ contemporary problems, the more it became an open arena for 
political discussions. Lastly, conservative clergy started a cultural revolution in Iran in 
order to clear away the remnants of the Shah’s secularization, but it would backfire. From 
governmental institutions to Iranians’ clothes, the revolutionaries dictated Islamic 
principles and forced them on society. For example, universities in Iran closed in 1980 
and their curriculum was rearranged according to Islamic standards between 1980 and 
1983.191  “Workplaces, factories, banks and hospitals became sites of moral prescription; 
sex segregation and daily collective prayers were imposed by law and enforced by hard-
line Islamic associations.”192 The Islamization project was forced into all social life in 
Iran to build an Islamic identity, but this forced Islamization was accepted with different 
interpretations, if not totally reversed. A new generation molded Shi’a Islam according to 
their individual world views.    
 For nearly two decades, the IRI contained emerging dissident social forces and 
kept them from challenging the regime with the help of the Iran-Iraq War and the 
charismatic leadership of Khomeini. Later, the successors of Khomeini used all their 
coercive power and assets to suppress any opposition; new social movements, however, 
started to utilize the outcomes of the revolution. The Students Movement was the first 
trial of social movements in Iran in 1999. Later, the Green Movement completely turned 
into a pro-democracy movement with broader demands, diverse and more participants, 
and expanded frames.    
190 Jill Diane Swenson, “Martyrdom: Mytho-Cathexis and the Mobilization,” 122. 
191 Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 288. 
192 Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, 56. 
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 B. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AS A BYPRODUCT OF REVOLUTION 
The Student Movement of 1999 was the first attempt of social movements to 
change the regime after a long period of an absence of political dissidence. Students, 
allying with the reformist elite, started the beginning of the divine legitimacy’s end. 
Although the movement was unsuccessful since it could not achieve an institutional 
change and was suppressed immediately, students became a “focal point of Iran’s 
political developments”193 and proved their potential to become a potent force for future 
pro-democracy movements. In addition, the movement carried the political discussions in 
front of the public and uncovered the liberal tendencies of Iranian society. When the IRI 
government severely attacked the students, the Islamic regime started to lose its 
legitimacy. 
The 1999 Student Movement was a civil collective reaction against Iranian state 
repression of freedom of speech and assembly and brutality. Although the first signs of 
this movement emerged during reformist President Khatami’s campaign when Iranian 
students effectively participated between February and May 1997, the huge mobilization 
of students in Tehran, Tabriz, and fourteen other Iranian cities starting on July 7, 1999 to 
protest the closure of the daily Salaam magazine marked the movement’s national and 
international recognition.194 The students’ demands changed during the protests but 
stayed limited. Their initial protest, prior to the state brutality, was against the closure of 
Salaam and about the press law. After the attack by security forces and militias, the 
demands turned into “the return of victim's bodies, removal of the head of security forces, 
identification and punishment of plain clothed individuals (militias) involved in the raid, 
the accountability for the attack by the Leader, an apology to students for insults they 
were subjected to during the raid, medical and psychological attention for the injured, 
compensation for damages, and so on.”195 The IRI government was slow to respond to 
the students’ demands. Students grew more frustrated, and their slogans turned more 
critical and radical with inconsistent demands. They even mocked the new Supreme 
193 Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 84. 
194 Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 283. 
195 Ali Akbar Mahdi, “The Student Movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 6-6. 
 74 
                                                 
 Leader for the first time, saying, “Khameinei! Shame on you; leadership is not for you” 
and “Incompetent leader of the time, is the true cause of this crime.”196  
The built-in handicaps of the Iranian political system started to work with the 
elections. In 1997, for the first time the Iranian presidential elections handed over the 
most powerful elected institution of the Iranian political system, the presidency, to the 
reformist elite with a strong popular legitimacy. The Iranians elected Muhammad 
Khatami with 69 percent of the vote.197 His landslide victory was a testimony to Iranians, 
especially the youth, to demand change since his campaign had stressed populism, 
economic growth, accountable government, rule of law, and respect for civil rights that 
would develop a better society in Iran. President Khatami tried to use his strong public 
support and election victory to change the Islamic regime to more liberal ways and 
challenged the divine legitimacy implicitly for the first time in Iran, even though the 
system was under the strict control of the new Supreme Leader. After the elections, the 
Khatami period relatively relaxed state repression and carried political discussions to the 
public. The number of publications, ranging from daily newspapers to journals, increased 
and reached more than 1,200.198 President Khatami also focused on empowering Iranian 
citizens and promoted the rule of law with his reformist policies. 
His attempts, however, were undermined by unelected bodies of the government. 
The conservative clergy was aware that the new Supreme Leader Khamenei was not 
capable of challenging the reformist president’s huge popular support among Iranians, 
even with his office’s powers, since Khatami was elected instead of Ayatollah Montazeri 
(who was the Khomeini’s designated successor, given his religious credentials and long 
association with the regime). The conservatives had to bring together all available forces 
to contain the president in decision making and legislature.199 The Guardian Council and 
judiciary played the leading part in this confrontation. The Guardian Council vetoed the 
legislation that reformists passed in the Majles on “women’s rights, family law, the 
196 Jenny Lo, “Achieving the Unexpected,” 100. 
197 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives, 5.  
198 Nasser Momayesi, “Iran’s Struggle for Democracy,” 62. 
199 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, “The Conservative Consolidation in Iran,” 177. 
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 prevention of torture and electoral reform.”200 The judiciary targeted the freedom of the 
press. While the pro-Khatami press was flourishing after the relaxation of state 
repression, the Supreme Leader called the reformist journalism a grave threat. The 
Iranian judiciary banned 108 newspapers and magazines between 1997 and 2002.201 
While state repression was increasing once again, state violence directly 
mobilized huge numbers of students to protest the regime when one of the daily 
magazines, Salaam, was closed by the government in July 1999. The possibility of a 
more dangerous situation of political dissent had caused a severe response from the 
conservative authority. Students at the University of Tehran started riots in response to 
the closure on the evening of July 7 and continued the next day, but the Revolutionary 
Guards, regular police, and hooligans of the Helpers of God (Ansar Allah)202 violently 
tried to suppress the initial movement. The students were beaten, shot, and arrested, 
causing an officially unreleased number of casualties more than 200 injured and some 
500 arrests. Thus, in response to this violence, the protests spread to Tabriz and fourteen 
other Iranian cities.  
In general, the mobilizing structures and resources increased with the reform 
efforts of Khatami. However, the students among the growing number of Iranian youth 
were the first to challenge the regime. They were mobilized in the universities, where 
they could freely discuss the problems of the state and society, as they had mobilized two 
decades earlier for conservative clergy. The revolutionaries had created the student 
organizations to support their ideology and produce a new generation to serve them, but 
their initial supporters became their rivals later. The students’ world views and political 
stance changed in response to state-attributed economic and political problems, as much 
as they were shaped by the new intellectuals’ ideas. Students represented the part of 
society  most deeply impacted by the chronic economic problems of Iran. Their changing 
world views made them realize the necessity for a more open society and personal 
freedoms. While they were educated and informed with the ideas of new intellectuals, 
200 Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, Evolving Iran, 65. 
201 Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, 93. 
202 Said Amir Arjomand, “Civil Society and the Rule of Law,” 291. 
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 they began to see the illegitimacy of divine rule. The educational environment at Iranian 
universities and student organizations’ connections helped students to mobilize, as 
explained in Chapter III.  
Growing ideas about personal liberty and freedom within the ideological 
framework of Shi’a Islam framed the student movements. The students’ support of the 
reformist elite and protest against the closure of the opposition’s press were a reaction to 
state repression of personal freedoms, and this reaction was compatible with Islam. While 
the students were alienated from the IRI’s ideology because of the failure of the 
revolution’s “Islamic Utopianism,”203 they were influenced by the ideas of new religious 
intellectuals. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Abdolkarim Soroush and Mosen Kadivar 
were among the most notable ones of these intellectuals, who also included President 
Katami.204 These intellectuals generally argued the importance of popular legitimacy and 
the rule of law in Islamic terms, as opposed to the conservatives who saw the importance 
of divine legitimacy with Islamic values. Although these ideas had existed before, the 
difference this time was that these new religious intellectuals were disseminating their 
message through growing numbers of pro-reformist press outlets and reaching out to the 
students in universities in person. 
The student protests in July 1999 marked the “beginning of the end” or “Iran’s 
second revolution”205 for many analysts. Huge numbers of students filled Iranian streets, 
and campuses saw growing numbers of student organizations and rising political activism 
carried out. The reformist elite could have used the movement as leverage to further 
undermine the legitimacy of divine rule if they had wanted. However, both the reformist 
elite’s unwillingness to do so and the belligerent behavior of some of the student groups 
that clashed with security forces prevented that. Moreover, what was missing in terms of 
social movements in the students’ uprising was that the students lacked a unified 
leadership to keep demonstrations peaceful and maintain consistent demands.206  
203 Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 302. 
204 Mehran Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, 122. 
205 Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran’s Theocracy under Siege,” 135. 
206 Elaine Sciolino, “Iran Students Halt Protests But Still Press for Changes.” 
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 C. GREEN WAVES OF A UNIFIED PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT  
Unlike the 1999 Student Movement, the Green Movement was a pro-democracy 
movement that united the separate mobilized groups with broader frames and peaceful 
tactics in reaction to the 2009 presidential election’s results. It arguably shook the IRI’s 
legitimacy after Supreme Leader Khamenei’s partiality in response to the alleged election 
fraud, when he backed President Ahmadinejad and the Iranian government’s brutal 
repression of peaceful protesters. The Green Waves changed Iranians’ opinion about the 
regime’s legitimacy.  
The initial slogan in the protest, “Where is my vote?,”207 was invoked by the 
opposition groups to demand their stolen votes and annulment of the election, but the 
demands expanded in time and targeted directly the Supreme Leader Khamenei as 
discussed in Chapter IV.  
The Green Movement happened when the Iranian state’s continuous and 
occasional opportunities, along with threats, served in different ways for a larger group of 
opposition. Before the 2009 elections, although the conservative camp seemed united, 
there was an internal power struggle between traditional and new conservatives that 
created an opportune division of the elite for opposition groups, especially the reformist 
elite, to exploit. The presidency of Ahmadinejad transformed the political struggle in Iran 
from conservative versus reformist to an intra-conservative one.208 The conservatives, in 
fact, had created their own paradox when they tried to contend with liberal reform efforts 
during President Khatami’s two-term presidency by empowering the security and 
economic apparatus of the IRI while the Guardian Council and judiciary attacked the 
reformers’ assets.209  A new faction of conservatives was born as neo-conservatives or 
neo-principalists,210 whose members were rising from the echelons of the IRGC and 
Basij. 
207 Abbas Milani, “The Green Movement.”  
208 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives, 54. 
209 Vali Nasr, “The Conservative Wave Rolls On,” 16. 
210 Roozbeh Safshekan and Farzan Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians,” 550. 
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 While the conservative elite was being divided further with the rise of neo-
conservatives and the intra-conservative struggle was continuing, the 2009 presidential 
election and relative relaxation of state restrictions on media during the election period 
provided an occasional political opportunity for the reformist groups. Former President 
Mohammad Khatami initially announced his candidacy, but later withdrew in favor of 
Mir Hossein Mousavi. The reason for Mousavi’s re-emergence in politics was primarily 
because of his disagreement with President Ahmadinejad’s policies. He emphasized the 
necessity of addressing the poor economy and “dishonest methods of making economic 
and political decisions.”211  Mousavi’s presidential campaign mobilized the major 
reformist groups as much as others who were eager to remove Ahmadinejad. 
The rise of Mousavi and his election campaign raised a challenging constituency, 
but the Green Movement had already started and the legitimacy of the IRI began to shake 
when the election was alleged to be rigged and ended with Ahmadinejad’s landslide 
victory. The result was problematic, since the number of eligible voters was lower than in 
the previous elections in 2008, which was impossible with the population growth rate of 
Iran. Moreover, the SMS network had been turned off, observers of Mousavi’s campaign 
were expelled from polling stations, and insufficient precautions were taken to prevent 
vote selling and ballot-box stuffing. The IRI’s government never took any real action to 
appoint an independent commission to investigate the election fraud. All of this 
undermined both the credibility of the elections and public trust in the electoral system.212 
The problematic presidential election created question marks on the tenets of the popular 
legitimacy of the system, but the Supreme Leader made his biggest mistake when he 
supported President Ahmadinejad after the elections and warned that he would use 
violence to stop protests. He had not made such a mistake during the 1999 Student 
Movement that directly confronted him and his office with Iranians in the streets. 
Although the IRI’s continuous and occasional political opportunities were 
working, the main motives of protesters in the Green Movement were the economic 
problems, state repression, and the sudden erosion of civil rights after the elections. 
211 Jenny Lo, “Achieving the Unexpected,” 131. 
212 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “Iran’s Presidential Election,” 15. 
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 President Ahmadinejad’s populist policies and pragmatic efforts could not solve Iran’s 
prolonged economic problems, which mobilized many Iranians first to support Mousavi 
and later the Green Movement. However, it was state repression and theft of Iranians’ 
votes that changed economic grievances into political demands and brought huge 
numbers of people into the streets. 
Although the Green Movement in Iran did not have an intact hierarchical 
structure, the reformist faction of the ruling Shi’a clergy, many intellectuals from 
universities, journalists, and a growing educated middle class took part in the Green 
Movement. Their organizational capabilities and links had increased with the help of the 
Khatami era reforms and strengthened in time. While reformists proposed better 
governance and took support mainly from the urban middle class in the election, Iranian 
students and women became the frontrunners of the movement with their informal and 
underground links to Iranian society. Although there is scarce data about the Green 
Movement’s mobilizing resources, information and communication technologies were 
among the biggest resources of the movement that enabled the opposition to bypass 
government censorship and inform Iranians. 
Shi’a Islam and its daily practices framed the Green Movement in Iran. The new 
version of reformist Shi’a Islam, growing ideas of freedom and democracy among Iranian 
youth with an Islamist perspective, and the holy struggle against tyranny told in Shi’a 
history resonated in both the minds and hearts of the Green Wave’s protesters.  The 
Green Movement attacked the regime’s monopoly on Shi’a Islam by reinterpreting the 
meaning of injustice and equating the incumbent government with the secular regime of 
the Shah. The protesters used Shi’a Islam’s values, symbols, stories, and practices in their 
actions, just as the 1979 revolutionary groups had done. They placed the Green 
Movement’s martyrs next to the Shi’a Imam, Ali, in their fight against the injustice of the 
IRI’s government.213 It was a “cultural jiu-jitsu,”214 as Charles Kurzman put it. The 
Iranian government’s reaction and its repression showed the conservatives’ fear of losing 
their power. 
213 Michael M. J. Fischer, “The Rhythmic Beat of the Revolution in Iran,” 509. 
214 Charles Kruzman, “Cultural Jiu-Jitsu and the Iranian Greens,” 9. 
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 The Green Movement lost its intensity when the IRI’s government increased the 
level of violent repression, but the movement was never totally dissolved. Although many 
thought it was unsuccessful when it waned, the Green Movement was actually a victory 
in two ways. First, the movement was successful in uniting the separate mobilized social 
groups with broader frames and peaceful tactics. Second, the movement silently 
continued, and its efforts changed Iranians’ opinion, which eventually was reflected in 
the election of a reformist candidate in the first round of the 2013 presidential elections.  
D. CONCLUSION 
It is too early to tell whether this chance will bring more liberties and more 
democratic governance to Iran. Future actions of the new Iranian president will show it. 
This is also not to say that the Green Movement is finished because its demands are not 
yet fulfilled. One thing, for sure, in Iran now is that the government solved the election 
problem without a huge confrontation with the Iranians, but social movements are still 
there and demanding more liberalization in Iran. This thesis lacks data about the effects 
of social movements on the electorate’s behavior, which necessitates further research, but 
it still suggests that there have been effects on society and public opinion in the form of a 
different state structure and society. While social movements are on the rise in the Middle 
East and North Africa and their effects are still unseen, this thesis can be an example for 
scholars of social movements and politics to better assess the consequences of these 
social movements and their effects on those countries’ domestic politics and societies.     
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